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SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM BY SAVING 
HEALTH REFORM: IMPLICATIONS OF 
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS 
Brietta Clark* 
          On June 28,
 
2012, the Supreme Court issued one of its most 
anticipated decisions in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (“NFIB”)—the constitutional challenge to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). The ACA is President 
Obama’s signature accomplishment and creates a number of reforms 
intended to reduce cost, improve the quality of healthcare and health 
outcomes, and expand access to care. The main pillars of the ACA are 
the expansions of public and private insurance coverage. These 
expansions were the targets of a number of legal challenges by states, 
private individuals, and various organizations, with two reaching the 
Supreme Court in NFIB. The first, and the one that has received the 
most attention, was the challenge to the individual mandate as 
exceeding Congress’s commerce and taxing powers. The second was a 
challenge to the structure of the Medicaid expansion as coercive in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment limit on Congress’s spending power. 
These challenges were also significant because if either provision had 
been found unconstitutional, it might have been used to invalidate the 
entire heath reform law. 
          The political and legal commentary about the challenges focused 
on the mandate as an exercise of the commerce power. Opponents of 
reform warned that upholding the mandate would lead to an 
unprecedented expansion of federal power in violation of our dual 
system of government. They shaped the dominant narrative that 
presented federal power as an inherent threat to state sovereignty and 
individual liberty. The mandate was seen as the beginning of a parade 
of other horrible intrusions into our personal lives, and state opposition 
as essential to protecting personal liberty. In this narrative, NFIB 
presented the Court with a dichotomous choice: Would the conservative 
majority—Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Alito, Scalia, 
 
 * Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; J.D., University of Southern 
California Law School; B.A., University of Chicago. The author would like to thank the Loyola 
of Los Angeles Law Review editorial staff, and especially Production Editor Nicole Kau and 
Editor-in-Chief Scott Klausner, for their incredible work on this Article. 
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Thomas, and Kennedy—take this opportunity to further limit federal 
power, or could the liberal wing of the Court sway one of the other 
Justices (most wrongly predicted Justice Kennedy) to uphold the 
mandate? The Court surprised many by answering “yes” to both. 
          The Court upheld the mandate as a constitutional exercise of the 
taxing power and preserved the Medicaid expansion as an option for 
states, but Chief Justice Roberts’s approach defied the simplistic 
narrative that dominated commentary before the decision. By upholding 
the mandate and the ACA, the Court has preserved a powerful new 
version of cooperative federalism in healthcare—one that creates a 
federal platform for state experimentation, innovation, and regulation 
to facilitate meaningful choice in the private health-insurance market. 
At the same time, however, Chief Justice Roberts penned certain parts 
of the opinion that may advance more traditional federalist aims of 
limiting the commerce and spending powers. Most notable was the 
Court’s unprecedented finding that the Medicaid expansion was 
structured in a coercive way and so could not be required as a 
condition of Medicaid participation generally. States now have the 
choice to opt in to the expansion or to refuse to participate, creating 
uncertainty for the poorest residents in states that opposed reform. 
More fundamentally, this holding suggests that the Spending Clause 
may now be a more viable site for federalism-based attacks and used to 
limit the federal government’s ability to adapt its spending conditions 
to changing realities in longstanding healthcare programs like 
Medicaid and Medicare. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 28,
 
2012, the Supreme Court issued one of its most 
anticipated decisions in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (“NFIB”)
1
—the constitutional challenge to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or the “Act”).
2
 The 
ACA is President Obama’s signature accomplishment. It relies on a 
host of reforms designed to reduce cost, improve the quality of 
healthcare and health outcomes, and expand access to care. But the 
linchpin of reform, and the piece receiving the overwhelming amount 
of attention, is its attempt to improve healthcare access by expanding 
public and private insurance coverage. Increased coverage should 
help improve health outcomes and reduce healthcare costs by 
ensuring that people can get access to the right kind of care at the 
right time to help prevent illness or avoidable hospitalizations.
3
 
Coverage also helps prevent the harmful cost shifting and rise in 
costs that result from uncompensated medical treatment.
4
 The ACA 
is the most significant expansion of coverage since Medicare and 
Medicaid in 1965. 
On the public side, the ACA broadens Medicaid eligibility.
5
 
Traditionally, Medicaid only covered certain categories of the very 
poor: children, pregnant women, people with disabilities, and some 
parents of covered children. Though not explicitly labeled as such, 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in various sections 
of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 3. See, e.g., Katherine Brandon, The President on Health Care: “We are Going to Get this 
Done”, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 17, 2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 
The-President-on-Health-Care-We-are-Going-to-Get-this-Done; see also Peter Orszag, To Save 
Money, Save the Health Care Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A29 (arguing that the ACA will 
reduce healthcare costs); The Right Care at the Right Time: Leveraging Innovation to Improve 
Health Care Quality for All Americans: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 57–
69 (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office) (same). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E) (2010) (“The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year 
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured. By significantly reducing the 
number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will 
significantly reduce this economic cost.”). 
 5. For a comprehensive overview of the ACA, see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW [hereinafter SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM 
LAW], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf (last modified Apr. 15, 
2011), as well as Part II.A.1 of this Article. 
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this line drawing seemed to reflect assumptions about who was 
“deserving” of help, based in part on assumptions about the ability of 
the working poor to pay for insurance. After decades of criticism that 
Medicaid’s categories did not accurately reflect the reality of access 
to employment-based or individual coverage in the private market, 
the ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility to cover all adults who fall 
below a certain income level.
6
 States’ responses were mixed: some 
eagerly anticipated the federal money they would get to expand care, 
and others decried the federal expansion as coercive of and 
financially untenable for the states.
7
 As important as this expansion 
was seen for future beneficiaries and states, however, it did not 
receive nearly as much attention as the private insurance reforms. 
Congress enacted a number of reforms designed to ensure access 
to affordable insurance coverage in the private market. These 
included the guaranteed-issue requirement, prohibition on pre-
existing condition exclusions, and rate regulation of insurance 
premiums.
8
 The ACA also authorized creation of health benefit 
exchanges, virtual-health-care markets used to facilitate consumer 
enrollment in, and government oversight over, health plans.
9
 In 
general, there seemed to be a great deal of public support for these 
consumer protections.
10
 But a critical component of this reform—the 
individual mandate—has been much less popular. The individual 
mandate is the requirement that citizens either obtain insurance 
coverage or make an annual “shared responsibility payment” to the 
federal government.
11
 Policymakers considered the mandate 
necessary to ensure that enough healthy people would join the 
insurance pool to help spread the risk and keep insurance rates 
down.
12
 
 
 6. See SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 9. Id. at 4–6. 
 10. There is widespread support for other ACA protections that have already taken effect, 
such as the under-twenty-six age requirement and the medical-loss ratio established to ensure that 
plans spend at least a certain percentage of premiums on medical care. Id. at 6. 
 11. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
 12. It does this by preventing adverse selection by consumers—that is, the process of 
waiting until one is sick and needs insurance before entering the pool. See id. at 2585. Requiring 
insurance companies to cover everyone regardless of risk at comparable pricing without a 
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Minutes after the law was signed, the first legal challenge to 
health reform was filed by Florida through its state attorney 
general,
13
 joined thereafter by twelve other states’ attorneys general 
or governors,
14
 two individual plaintiffs, and the National Federation 
of Independent Business.
15
 Within two months, another dozen 
lawsuits were filed by other states, businesses, individuals, and 
private associations.
16
 Although various aspects of the reform law 
were challenged, the overwhelming focus of the challenges was the 
individual mandate: it proved to be a lightning rod for political and 
legal challenges to the ACA as a whole.
17
 
A key legal question that surfaced early in litigation was 
whether the mandate was unconstitutional because Congress had 
exceeded the scope of one of its enumerated powers under the 
Constitution.
18
 The mandate was justified as an exercise of two 
powers: Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and its 
power to tax and spend for the general welfare.
19
 Very quickly, 
however, the focus of the constitutional question sharpened around 
the commerce power issue: every court hearing the issue rejected the 
taxing power justification, while a split emerged among the circuits 
on the commerce question, making Supreme Court review 
inevitable.
20
 This focus was also evident in much of the legal 
scholarship, which viewed the mandate as reviving a longstanding 
debate about federalism and the proper balance of federal–state 
 
mandate would expose insurers to potentially exorbitant costs, which would lead to a “death-
spiral” of insurers fleeing the market, undermining access goals. Id. at 2626 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 13. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 14. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus, 132 S. Ct. at 2580. Eventually the number of state plaintiffs 
rose to twenty-six. They included Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.; Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 15. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of 
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 1–2 (2011). 
 18. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577. 
 19. Id. at 2584. 
 20. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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power in the Commerce Clause.
21
 Reform opponents criticized the 
ACA as a federal takeover that undermined states’ rights and the 
mandate as a compelling example of how federal power threatened 
individual liberties. “What’s next?” they asked, “Can the government 
force us to eat broccoli, buy American-made cars, join a health 
club?”
22
 
In contrast to the mandate, the states’ challenge to the Medicaid 
expansion received less attention. They claimed that requiring 
participation in the expansion as a condition of existing Medicaid 
funding was a coercive use of the federal government’s spending 
power, which violated the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition on 
federal usurpation of state authority or commandeering of state 
legislative functions.
23
 This claim likely did not receive as much 
attention because Medicaid is voluntary for states, courts have 
routinely upheld amendments expanding eligibility, and the 
challenge was not faring well in lower courts. Moreover, most 
scholars seemed to agree that the spending power was incredibly 
expansive and not a viable means through which to narrow federal 
power.
24
 Consequently, many people were surprised when the 
Supreme Court also granted certiorari on this issue. 
Even after the Supreme Court agreed to hear both challenges, 
commentary continued to focus the constitutional question and 
federalism debate on the mandate as an exercise of the commerce 
power.
25
 Reform proponents and opponents wondered whether the 
Roberts Court would continue the trend of the Rehnquist Court in 
narrowing federal power to strike down the mandate in the name of 
 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Brief in Support at 17–18, Thomas 
More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156) 
(claiming that upholding the mandate under the Commerce Clause would give the government 
“unfettered power” to require private citizens “to engage in affirmative acts, . . . such as joining 
health clubs, buying a GMC truck, or purchasing an AIG insurance policy”); see also James B. 
Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at A1 
(describing Justice Scalia’s question in oral arguments to the government’s counsel asking 
whether requiring Americans to buy health insurance could allow the government to force people 
to buy other things that are good for them, such as broccoli). 
 23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 24. See infra Part III.B. 
 25. See infra Part III. 
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federalism. The dominant narrative suggested a dichotomous choice: 
Would the conservative majority—Chief Justice Roberts with 
Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy—take this opportunity 
to further limit federal power, or could the liberal wing of the Court 
sway one of these Justices (most wrongly predicted Justice Kennedy) 
to uphold the mandate? The Court ultimately defied this simplistic 
narrative, and many expectations, by answering yes—to both. 
By upholding the mandate and the ACA, the Court in NFIB 
preserved a powerful new version of cooperative federalism in 
healthcare—one that creates a federal platform for state 
experimentation, innovation, and regulation to facilitate meaningful 
choice in the private health insurance market. At the same time, 
Chief Justice Roberts penned parts of the opinion that seemed more 
consistent with federalism-based attacks on health reform and 
demands for more robust limits on the government’s commerce and 
spending powers.
26
 Of particular import was the Court’s 
unprecedented finding that the Medicaid expansion was structured in 
a coercive way and so could not be made a required condition of 
Medicaid participation generally.
27
 NFIB gives states the choice to 
opt in to the expansion or to refuse participation in it, creating 
uncertainty for the poorest residents in states that have opposed 
reform. More fundamentally, however, this holding raises questions 
about whether the Spending Clause will now be seen as a more 
viable site for federalism-based attacks, in general, and specifically if 
this will be used to limit the federal government’s ability to adapt 
spending conditions to changing realities in longstanding healthcare 
programs like Medicaid and Medicare. The constitutional and health 
policy implications of NFIB will likely be explored for years to 
come, and this Article contributes to the beginning of this 
exploration. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of 
the public and private expansions of the ACA, as well as the political 
and legal attacks mounted immediately after it was passed. Part III 
describes the legal and political commentary leading up to NFIB, 
highlighting the dominant narratives used to frame the challenges. 
 
 26. See infra Parts III & VI. 
 27. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604, 2608. 
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Parts IV and V explore the Court’s decision in NFIB in greater 
detail. Part IV explains the rationale of a divided Court in upholding 
the mandate. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, holding 
that the individual coverage requirement was constitutional under the 
taxing power. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito (the 
“Joint Dissenters”) issued a joint dissent concluding that the mandate 
could not be justified under the taxing power or the commerce 
power. Chief Justice Roberts, this time writing for himself, also 
concluded that the mandate would violate the Commerce Clause. 
Part IV.A begins with the Commerce Clause holding because 
this is where NFIB’s constitutional analysis begins, and this issue 
received the most attention. This section highlights the importance of 
the activity-inactivity distinction central to Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion and to the joint dissent. Although the Joint Dissenters did not 
join the Chief Justice’s opinion on this issue, all five Justices made 
clear that the commerce power does not permit Congress to “compel 
the purchase of an unwanted product,” in this case health insurance. 
Part IV.B looks more closely at the taxing-power justification 
for the mandate, describing the Justices’ struggle over the proper 
characterization of the shared responsibility payment as a “penalty” 
(which must be justified under the commerce power) or a “tax” 
(which can be easily satisfied under the broader taxing power). A 
majority of the Court concluded that the shared responsibility 
payment functions more like a tax on the choice not to buy insurance 
than a true penalty that forces people to buy insurance. 
Part V describes the rationale of a divided Court in upholding a 
limited version of the Medicaid expansion based on its 
unprecedented finding of coercion. Part V.A analyzes the coercion 
holding. This time, seven Justices, in two separate opinions, found 
the expansion as structured coercive. Central to this coercion finding 
was the characterization of the expansion as a “new” and different 
program, rather than an example of the typical eligibility expansions 
upheld in the past. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer 
and Kagan, and the Joint Dissenters, all expressed the concern that 
states could not have anticipated this dramatic transformation and 
that conditioning existing Medicaid funds on participation in this 
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new program created a threat that served no purpose other than to 
force unwilling states to participate. This threat, especially in light of 
the amount of funding at risk, was coercive. 
Part V.B describes the Court’s remedy for this violation, and this 
is where the decision broke down along the familiar 5-4 divide. 
Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by 
Justices Breyer, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, held that the 
Court could simply sever the coercive penalty provision and held that 
Congress could not withdraw existing Medicaid funding from states 
that refuse to participate in the expansion. The Court preserved the 
expansion as an option for states and left the rest of the ACA intact. 
Part VI explores the implications of NFIB. Part VI.A suggests 
that NFIB raises important questions about the commerce power and 
the power to tax and spend as future sites of federalism-based 
attempts to limit federal power. It also considers the importance of 
judicial restraint in how the Roberts Court defines its role in this 
struggle. Part VI.B considers the potentially beneficial and harmful 
implications for health reform implementation and the future of 
health policy. This Article concludes by briefly describing future 
challenges that may keep lawyers and commentators busy for some 
time to come, but that cannot stop the implementation of reform that 
is already underway. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE ACA AND 
KEY PROVISIONS SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE 
The linchpin of the ACA’s reform is its expansion of public and 
private insurance coverage. Despite rhetoric describing the ACA as a 
federal takeover, the ACA builds upon the existing private–public 
patchwork of insurance coverage.
28
 The ACA assumes that people 
already eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, or fortunate enough to 
be covered through their employers, would keep that coverage.
29
 The 
 
 28. See, e.g., Alison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented 
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2010) (“The individual mandate has been 
held up as the ‘American’ way to achieve universal coverage, where every citizen can choose her 
own insurance, and commercial insurers can compete for profit.”). 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2010) (preserving of the right to maintain existing coverage); see 
also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 13, 16, 18 tbl.1 
(2012) [hereinafter “CBO ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE 
ACA”], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-
2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf (estimating the effects of the ACA’s insurance coverage provisions 
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ACA’s goal was to patch up some of the holes in this existing 
scheme by increasing insurance options for those excluded from the 
existing insurance market, either because coverage was unaffordable 
or because they were considered too high risk and denied coverage.
30
 
Nonetheless, the ACA has generated a wide range of political and 
legal responses, including challenges to this expansion. 
A.  Insurance Expansion 
in the ACA 
1.  Medicaid Expansion 
The primary public reform is the expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility. Medicaid is a joint federal–state program established in 
1965 to facilitate healthcare access for the very poor.
31
 It is 
voluntary: states have the option to receive federal matching funds 
for healthcare services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries as long as 
the states comply with federal program conditions.
32
 The federal 
 
on health insurance coverage); Hoffman, supra note 28, at 8, 15 (noting that the ACA was 
designed “to address the problem of [the] estimated 46 million uninsured Americans” and that the 
ACA “envision[s] using government mandates to achieve universal coverage without 
fundamentally restructuring the existing payment and delivery systems”). A number of studies 
provide support for this assumption about employer-based coverage. See, e.g., DELOITTE CTR. 
FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS & DELOITTE CONSULTING, 2012 DELOITTE SURVEY OF U.S. 
EMPLOYERS: OPINIONS ABOUT THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND PLANS FOR EMPLOYEE 
HEALTH BENEFITS 5 (2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Insights 
/centers/center-for-health-solutions/21c1f310fb8b8310VgnVCM3000001c56f00aRCRD.htm?id 
=us_furl_chs_employersurvey_072412 (finding that most employers do not intend to drop 
coverage, but that for those that do, prohibitive cost would be the likely cause); KEN JACOBS ET 
AL., RESEARCH BRIEF: NINE OUT OF TEN NON-ELDERLY CALIFORNIANS WILL BE INSURED 
WHEN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IS FULLY IMPLEMENTED 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/calsim_Exchange1.pdf (using the California 
Simulation of Insurance Markets (CalSIM) model to predict changes in healthcare coverage in 
California under the ACA and finding a small decline in employer-based coverage). 
 30. See At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could Affect One in Two Americans, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV (last visited Nov. 8, 2012, 2:02 AM), http://www.healthcare.gov/law/ 
resources/reports/preexisting.html; see also Hoffman, supra note 28, at 8–9, 17–19, 60–63 
(describing why the fragmented healthcare market leaves so many uninsured and critiquing 
whether the ACA can effectively address this problem); Brandon, supra note 3 (noting President 
Obama’s urgency in seeking health reform that would cover those with pre-existing conditions or 
who were otherwise priced out of the insurance market). 
 31. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A 
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 57, 61–62 (1974). 
 32. Id. at 57; HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED POLICY 
BRIEF: A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF HOW STATES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE AVAILABILITY OF 
  
Winter 2013] SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM 553 
government establishes minimal requirements for participation with 
respect to reimbursement, services provided, and eligibility criteria, 
but these standards leave a great deal of discretion and flexibility to 
the states, which are primarily responsible for program 
administration.
33
 For example, although Medicaid mandates 
coverage for certain categories of the very poor—children, pregnant 
women, the disabled, and the elderly—it gives states flexibility to 
cover “optional” categories.
34
 Over the years, there have also been 
numerous amendments to expand eligibility criteria.
35
 
In addition, states can seek a waiver to allow them to experiment 
in ways that may not fully comply with the law but still further the 
goal of providing healthcare to those in need in a cost-effective 
way.
36
 The federal government has been quite generous in granting 
states waivers from federal requirements, allowing a great deal of 
state variation and freedom from federal constraint even beyond that 
apparently anticipated in the law. States have used waivers to do 
things like change delivery methods, alter benefits and cost sharing, 
modify provider reimbursement, and increase the number of people 
covered.
37
 
 
FEDERAL FUNDS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2012) [hereinafter HISTORICAL REVIEW OF 
MEDICAID], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8349.pdf. 
 33. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 31, at 57–61. For example, subject to often vague 
federal standards or guidance, states are the ones that actually set reimbursement rates for 
healthcare providers, oversee the utilization review process for services, and determine whether 
and how to extend coverage for groups or services that are deemed optional by the federal 
government. See Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the 
Obama Administration is Undermining Its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L.J. 771, 793–
804 (2012) (describing the state flexibility created by the Medicaid Act). 
 34. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 31, at 61–65. 
 35. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-
Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 16–18 (2006); see also ANDY 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID 
RESOURCE BOOK app. I 175–77 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/ 
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=14255 (outlining the “major changes 
enacted by Congress since the initiation of Medicaid in 1965”). 
 36. See Clark, supra note 33, at 778–79. 
 37. See KAISER COMM’N ON KEY FACTS, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FIVE KEY 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT SECTION 1115 MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (June 2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8196.pdf 
(“Currently, 30 states and the District of Columbia operate one or more comprehensive Section 
1115 Medicaid waivers that involved an estimated $54.6 billion in federal outlays in 2011. These 
waivers generally fall into several categories, including waivers to implement managed care, to 
expand coverage with limited benefits, to restructure federal financing, and to expand coverage to 
low income adults in preparation for the Medicaid expansion in 2014.”); see also TIMOTHY 
STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE 
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The reality of this state–federal relationship is important to 
understand for a few of reasons. First, every state participates in the 
Medicaid program now because of the generous federal matching 
funds and state flexibility.
38
 Second, states have been important 
innovators in healthcare delivery and financing, experimenting with 
managed care, medical homes and hospital consolidations, and 
expanding clinics and outpatient care.
39
 Most importantly, the fact 
that so many states look for ways to expand coverage beyond the 
mandatory categories highlights the problem of a dysfunctional 
system that continues to exclude so many people. Despite these state-
driven reforms, many childless adults and the working poor remain 
excluded; thus, Medicaid expansion was a logical part of reform.
40
 
 
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 172 (2003) (stating that Arizona, Tennessee, and 
Oregon have adopted innovative approaches that have expanded coverage for the poor). Of 
course, this flexibility allows states to cut optional programs or groups later. See VERNON K. 
SMITH ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES: 
A LOOK AT MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 7 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter 
MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload 
/8248.pdf (“Eighteen states in both [fiscal years] 2011 and 2012 reported eliminating, reducing or 
restricting benefits. Elimination of, or limits on, dental, therapies, medical supplies and DME and 
personal care services were most frequently reported.”); Abby Goodnough, Medicaid Cuts Are 
Part of a Larger Battle in Maine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2011, at A11 (detailing Maine Governor 
Paul R. LePage’s proposed cuts in “optional benefits, including dental care and room and board at 
assisted living centers,” as well as his plan to make nineteen- and twenty-year-olds and childless 
adults ineligible, which would reduce the Medicaid rolls by sixty-five thousand). 
 38. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MEDICAID, supra note 32, at 1 (“Past experience shows that the 
availability of federal funds has served as an effective incentive for states to provide health 
coverage to meet the health and long-term care needs of their low-income residents despite state 
budget pressures.”). 
 39. See generally LEIGHTON KU & CHRISTINE FERGUSON, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. 
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS., MEDICAID WORKS: A REVIEW OF HOW PUBLIC 
INSURANCE PROTECTS THE HEALTH AND FINANCES OF CHILDREN AND OTHER VULNERABLE 
POPULATIONS 13 (June 2011), available at http://www.firstfocus.net/sites/default/files 
/MedicaidWorks.pdf (providing background information on how states are acting as innovators in 
healthcare delivery and financing). 
 40. See Rosenbaum, supra note 35, at 7 (“From a structural viewpoint, Medicaid can be 
thought of as a logical response to the nation’s market-oriented approach to health care financing 
and service delivery. Among industrial democracies, the United States stands alone in relying on 
voluntary markets to insure most of the population. Voluntary markets inevitably exclude persons 
who are unable to afford the going price or whose individual characteristics make them 
unattractive customers. With the cost of employer-sponsored family coverage hovering at 
$10,000 in 2004—among employers that elect to offer any coverage—private insurance is 
unaffordable to millions of people. Millions more find themselves either entirely or substantially 
barred from adequate coverage as a result of health problems that affect companies’ willingness 
to offer coverage at any price. Medicaid, in short, stands as the nation’s central means of 
compensating for the lack of a unified, population-based system of health care finance, the 
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The ACA has expanded eligibility to all adults with an income 
up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level, which is $15,415 per 
year for a single adult or $31,809 per year for a family of four.
41
 It 
also created incredibly generous federal funding for these “newly 
eligibles”: the federal government will fund 100 percent of most 
states’ costs from 2014 until 2016 and then gradually decrease its 
share to 90 percent in 2020 and thereafter.
42
 Thus, states’ share of the 
cost is capped at 10 percent for services provided and only incidental 
administrative expenses.
43
 When Congress passed the ACA, it 
expected that all states would want to continue participating in 
Medicaid and that the expansion would increase the insured by 15.9 
million people by 2019.
44
 This was due, in part, to the generous 
federal funding available, and, in part, to the fact that the ACA 
required states that wanted to continue participating in Medicaid to 
cover this additional group. Part V of this article explains how NFIB 
has made this expansion optional. 
2.  Private Insurance Reforms 
The private insurance provisions in the ACA were primarily 
directed at reforming the healthcare market to ensure that individuals 
and small businesses would have a meaningful choice of affordable 
 
consequence of which is the total or partial exclusion of tens of millions of persons who tend to 
be poorer and sicker than the norm.”); see also KRISTOF STREMIKIS ET AL., THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH CARE OPINION LEADERS’ VIEWS ON VULNERABLE 
POPULATIONS IN THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (2011), available at http://www 
.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Data%20Brief/2011/Aug/1536_Stremikis_H
COL_vulnerable_populations_data_brief.pdf (“Ninety percent of [survey respondents] think the 
current health system is unsuccessful in achieving equity on the whole . . . and surveyed leaders 
agree that the [ACA] will be helpful in closing the health care divide.”). 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(l) (effective Feb. 22, 2012); see also HENRY J. HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S 
MEDICAID EXPANSION 3 & n.10 (2012) [hereinafter “GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION”], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8347.pdf (providing a 
comprehensive overview of the Medicaid expansion). 
 42. GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION, supra 41, at 3. 
 43. Id. 
 44. JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATE-
BY-STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/medicaid-coverage-and-spending-in-health-reform-
national-and-state-by-state-results-for-adults-at-or-below-133-fpl.pdf; see also CBO ESTIMATES 
FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE ACA, supra note 29, at 1 (explaining that 
the CBO estimates assumed that every state would expand eligibility). 
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insurance options.
45
 The existing market is segmented into many 
different groups, each with different protections and access to care. 
Certain populations can access care through public entitlement 
programs, as seniors can through Medicare or the groups mentioned 
above through Medicaid.
46
 In the insurance market for employment-
based insurance, employees also benefit from special legal 
protections for members of group plans. For example, employers get 
tax incentives to provide health insurance as a form of compensation, 
which means that employees are typically only responsible for 
paying a portion of the premium.
47
 Insurers have also been 
prohibited from denying or pricing an employee’s policy based on 
that employee’s risk, which spreads the risk.
48
 These protections, 
along with employers’ bargaining power and the fact that employees 
tend to be healthy, have helped keep insurance affordable, especially 
for those employed in mid- to large-sized firms. 
Others have been left to fend for themselves in a private market 
where profit-driven insurers are free to deny coverage or price 
policies based on individual risk. Prior to the ACA, people in the 
individual market did not get the same kind of rating protection or 
tax benefits that would help make coverage affordable,
49
 contributing 
to the problem of a growing uninsured population. There was also 
the problem of underinsurance: some plans that were affordable had 
such high deductibles and offered such skimpy coverage that people 
discovered they could not afford the treatment they needed until it 
was too late.
50
 The ACA is designed to eliminate market 
impediments to affordable and meaningful coverage and is based on 
 
 45. See Brandon, supra note 3. 
 46. See generally STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 31, at 57 (providing a case-study 
analysis of the Medicaid program, its genesis, implementation, and the populations it covers). 
 47. See Hoffman, supra note 28, at 56–57. 
 48. Id. at 55–57. 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 50–57. 
 50. See Jay Hancock, The New Normal in Health Insurance: High Deductibles, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (June 3, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/June/04/high 
-deductible-health-insurance.aspx; Hazardous Health Plans: Coverage Gaps Can Leave You in 
Big Trouble, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/ 
2012/05/hazardous-health-plans/index.htm (last updated May 2009). 
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three pillars of reform: (1) consumer protections; (2) shared 
responsibility; and (3) the creation of a health benefit exchange.
51
 
a.  Consumer protections 
There are a number of consumer protections designed to ensure 
consumers’ access to affordable and meaningful insurance coverage. 
The guaranteed-issue requirement and prohibitions on pre-existing 
condition exclusions remove structural barriers to insurance.
52
 
Community rating requirements that spread risk more evenly among 
higher and lower risk individuals, and rate regulation designed to 
better align premiums with the amount of care and value of coverage 
provided, improve access by making insurance affordable.
53
 Finally, 
to ensure meaningful coverage, the law includes a number of 
protections, including prohibitions on caps for certain services and 
annual limits, rules on cost-sharing limits for preventive and other 
kinds of services, and a minimal set of “essential benefits” that plans 
must cover.
54
 The ACA also tries to improve coverage for groups 
that have historically fallen through the gaps of the insurance market 
(like young adults) and those disproportionately impacted by certain 
exclusions (like women and people living with HIV/AIDS).
55
 
b.  Shared responsibility and 
the individual mandate 
The shared responsibility aspect of reform spells out how 
various actors will help pay for or contribute to this new system, 
including the government, employers, and individuals. The federal 
 
 51. See SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5, at 1. 
 52. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 to -5 (Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
 53. See id. § 300gg. 
 54. Id. § 300gg-6; id. § 300gg-11; id. § 18021 
 55. See, e.g., id. 300gg-14 (extending dependent coverage for young adults up to age twenty 
six); see also INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 
18 (2011) (“The ACA has the potential to transform the way in which the U.S. health care system 
addresses women’s health issues in many ways. It expands access to coverage to millions of 
uninsured women, ends discriminatory practices such as gender rating in the insurance market, 
eliminates exclusions for preexisting conditions, and improves women’s access to affordable, 
necessary care. The Women’s Health Amendment . . . introduced by Senator Barbara Mikulski 
and which was added to the ACA, expands on these improvements by requiring that all private 
health plans cover—with no cost-sharing requirements—a newly identified set of preventive 
health care services for women.”); JEFFREY S. CROWLEY & JEN KATES, THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND HIV: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS? (2012), available at 
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/8363.pdf (describing the different provisions in the ACA that 
will help increase access to HIV and AIDS treatment). 
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government helps by providing subsidies for people who may not be 
able to afford insurance on their own and tax credits for small 
businesses with no more than twenty-five employees.
56
 Employers 
with fifty or more employees are expected to help by either 
providing the option for employment-based coverage or paying an 
assessment based on the number of employees seeking insurance 
through the exchange.
57
 Individuals can meet their responsibility 
either by purchasing insurance from a qualified health plan (the 
“mandate”) or by making a shared responsibility payment (also 
called a “penalty”).
58
 This mandate or penalty aspect of the reform 
has generated the most controversy. 
The President, then-Senator Obama, campaigned in 2008 against 
the individual mandate but was convinced thereafter about its 
necessity.
59
 Benefits and responsibility must go hand-in-hand: it is 
necessary to require citizens to obtain insurance coverage to ensure 
that healthy people are part of the insurance pool to help spread the 
risk. This guards against adverse selection by consumers, which is 
the process of waiting until one is sick or in need of insurance before 
entering the pool. Requiring insurance companies to cover everyone 
at generally comparable pricing, without a mandate, could lead to a 
“death spiral” of insurers fleeing the market, undermining access 
goals.
60
 Indeed, this is exactly what happened in states that tried this 
without a mandate; Massachusetts has been successful because its 
reform included a mandate, which is why it served as the model for 
the ACA.
61
 
 
 56. See SUMMARY OF HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 57. See id. at 1. 
 58. See id. at 1; see also 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2011) (describing the requirement to maintain 
minimum essential coverage); 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2005) (describing congressional findings as to 
the requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage). 
 59. See Andrew Cline, How Obama Broke His Promise on Individual Mandates, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/how-
obama-broke-his-promise-on-individual-mandates/259183/. 
 60. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2614 (2012). 
 61. Id. 
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c.  Health benefit exchanges 
and the role of states 
A health benefit exchange is the mechanism through which this 
new system of benefits and responsibility will be realized.
62
 The 
ACA gives states two options: states can get federal funding to help 
them create their own exchanges, or, if they choose not to participate, 
the federal government will create a federal exchange for people in 
states without one.
63
 Federal regulators will play an important role in 
helping to guide states about what the ACA requires, but both the 
ACA and the approach of federal regulators reflect the kind of 
flexibility and deference to state discretion that has been typical of 
the federal–state partnership in Medicaid.
64
 
States that choose to participate will have the power to define a 
number of elements of reform, including the essential minimum 
benefits that must be provided by all qualified health plans, cost-
sharing and tiered options offered by plans, systems for eligibility 
screening and enrollment, and consumer assistance plans.
65
 The 
exchanges will ensure that required disclosures about plan content 
and rates are made and that information provided to consumers is 
clear and unbiased.
66
 The ACA also requires that exchanges seek and 
use input from key stakeholders (including individual consumers, 
consumer advocates, the business community, healthcare providers, 
and health plans) in making these decisions, but states have a great 
deal of discretion about how to do this.
67
 These are just a few 
 
 62. See SABRINA CORLETTE, JOANN VOLK & KEVIN LUCIA, THE CTR. ON HEALTH INS. 
REFORMS & NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., PLAN MANAGEMENT: ISSUES FOR STATE, PARTNERSHIP 
AND FEDERALLY FACILITATED HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 1–3 (2012), available at 
https://gushare.georgetown.edu/xythoswfs/webui/_xy-8409729_2-t_aPsiEpMD (describing the 
exchange as the “lynchpin” of the ACA’s provisions to expand access to quality, affordable 
coverage). 
 63. See id. at 1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2006) (describing state obligations in 
administering the exchanges). 
 64. See generally MICAH WEINBERG & LEIF WELLINGTON HAASE, THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND, STATE-BASED COVERAGE SOLUTIONS: THE CALIFORNIA HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE 
(2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue% 
20Brief/2011/May/1507_Weinberg_california_hlt_benefit_exchange_ib.pdf (documenting and 
analyzing the state-based coverage solutions chosen by California in adopting its exchange); 
CORLETTE, VOLK & LUCIA, supra note 62 (describing the flexible approaches that states have in 
establishing exchanges under the ACA). 
 65. See CORLETTE, VOLK & LUCIA, supra note 62. 
 66. See id. at 12–15. 
 67. 45 C.F.R. § 155.130 (2012)); see also THE CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. 
OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLUEPRINT FOR APPROVAL OF 
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examples of the active role states can have in shaping health reform 
implementation. Moreover, just as in the Medicaid context, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) has indicated a 
willingness to consider waivers for states or insurers that need more 
time to adjust to new requirements.
68
 
B.  Responses and Legal 
Challenges to Reform 
In light of the media attention to the political and legal 
challenges to healthcare reform, one could easily get the impression 
that the reforms are wildly unpopular. In fact, the ACA reforms have 
yielded a range of responses from states and the public generally. 
Some states have welcomed the reforms, eagerly anticipating 
Medicaid funding to help them expand coverage
69
 and moving 
quickly to take advantage of the funding available for the creation of 
the exchanges.
70
 Notably, there has been bipartisan support in these 
states.
71
 
 
AFFORDABLE STATE-BASED AND STATE PARTNERSHIP INSURANCE EXCHANGES 21–25 (2012), 
available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/hie-blueprint-081312.pdf (outlining suggested 
requirements for exchanges in engaging stakeholders). 
 68. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State Challenges to the 
Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 806–07 (2012) (noting the 
responsiveness of the HHS to state insurance commissioners and the significant state flexibility 
that HHS has given in the form of waivers for certain insurance regulations). 
 69. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., HOW IS THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LEADING TO CHANGES IN MEDICAID TODAY? 1 
(May 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8312.pdf. 
 70. The federal government has issued more than $1.6 billion in grants. See Health 
Insurance Exchange Establishment Grants, 2012, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http:// 
statehealthfacts.kff.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=954&cat=17 (last visited Oct. 1, 2012); see also 
State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health 
-benefit-exch.aspx (last updated Oct. 2012) (providing an overview of how states plan to 
implement the exchange requirements of the ACA). 
 71. See, e.g., WEINBERG & HAASE, supra note 64, at 3 (noting that in California there “was 
a great deal of accord among the principals and staff of the Democratic-controlled legislature and 
the Republican Schwarzenegger administration, and the legislative process moved very quickly”); 
Colorado First State to Pass Exchange Legislation with Bipartisan Support, STATE HEALTH 
ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR. (June 3, 2011), http://www.shadac.org/blog/colorado-first-state 
-pass-exchange-legislation-bipartisan-support; see also Abby Goodnough, Liking It or Not, States 
Prepare for Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, at A1 (“Republicans who support state-run 
exchanges say they are embracing a fundamental conservative belief: that states should make 
their own decisions rather than cede control to the federal government.”). 
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Other states are supportive of reforms but have taken a more 
cautious approach. Uncertainty about the fate of reform made some 
states wary of making any investments initially.
72
 Some doubt their 
capacity to establish a health benefit exchange and maintain it once 
federal funding is no longer available.
73
 Finally, financial concerns 
make some states reticent to expand Medicaid despite generous 
federal funding; what appears to be a relatively small share of the 
cost is still significant in light of the numbers of newly eligible and 
the serious budgetary challenges the states face.
74
 Nonetheless, states 
that did not initially embrace reform are finding it difficult to resist 
the generous funding and are reconsidering their position.
75
 There is 
also evidence of significant support among individuals and small 
businesses for consumer protections—like the guaranteed-issue 
requirement and prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusions—
and federal subsidies and tax credits.
76
 Predictably, the mandate has 
been more controversial.
77
 
 
 72. See Timing Matters: States Waiting for a Supreme Court Decision to Plan an Exchange, 
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 25, 2012), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/ 
quicktake_SCOTUS_exchanges.cfm. 
 73. HHS created another option for these states: a federal–state exchange option that gives 
states the flexibility to decide which aspects of reform implementation it would like to oversee 
and which it would like the federal government to undertake. See THE CTR. FOR CONSUMER 
INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 67. 
 74. See Dan Diamond, How Much Will States’ Medicaid Expansions Really Cost?, 
CALIFORNIA HEALTHLINE (July 18, 2012), http://www.californiahealthline.org/road-to-reform/ 
2012/how-much-will-states-medicaid-expansions-really-cost.aspx; see also KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., UPDATE: STATE BUDGETS IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY (2011), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8253.pdf (analyzing recent trends in state government 
finances). 
 75. See Goodnough, supra note 71 (noting that some Republican state leaders are having 
“underground” discussions about establishing exchanges); see also Tom Cohen, Some States Not 
Changing Course Amid Rising Tide of Health Care Reform, CNN (July 4, 2012, 7:54 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/04/politics/health-care-states/index.html (noting that even for states 
with conservative lawmakers ideologically opposed to reform, the financial incentives may create 
an offer too good to refuse). 
 76. See Patricia Zengerle, Most Americans Oppose Health Law But Like Provisions, 
REUTERS (June 24, 2012, 1:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-usa 
-campaign-healthcare-idUSBRE85N01M20120624; J.D. Harrison, Mixed Emotions: Small 
Business Owners, Advocates Respond to Health-care Ruling, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/mixed-emotions-small-business 
-owners-advocates-respond-to-health-care-ruling/2012/06/28/gJQAALaI9V_story.html; see also 
NPR, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE PUBLIC ON 
REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO HAVE HEALTH INSURANCE (Feb. 2008), available at http://www 
.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7754.pdf (investigating public sentiments about healthcare reform). 
 77. See NPR, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra 
note 76. In a recent poll about health reform, the only individual element to garner substantially 
unfavorable views was the mandate/penalty provision. Id. But the poll also found that six in ten 
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States, individuals, organizations, and lawmakers opposed to 
reform have been extremely vocal, attacking reform on every front. 
At the federal level, Republican politicians have threatened repeal as 
well as other obstructionist political measures, such as defunding and 
the use of legislative hearings, to impede reform implementation.
78
 
Some Republican-led states announced their refusal to participate in 
the private or public insurance expansion, with the individual 
mandate serving as the focal point of these attacks.
79
 Others have 
gone even further, passing nullification legislation to obstruct federal 
reform efforts.
80
 
But the most pervasive and viable form of attack has been legal 
challenges filed by individuals, business associations, religious 
organizations, and states
81
 in courts throughout the country. These 
 
people support a broad approach to ensure everyone has coverage, which includes an individual 
mandate. Id. For some, support for the mandate seemed tied to expansion of public insurance and 
the availability of subsidies. For those opposing a mandate, the main reason for opposition was 
concern about people being forced to buy insurance if they cannot afford it. Id. 
 78. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Role of State Resistance in 
Health Care Decision-Making, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 73, 73–74 (2011). 
 79. See Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 
NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-laws-
and-actions-challenging-ppaca.aspx (last updated Oct. 19, 2012) (detailing in Table 1 the state 
laws challenging or opting out of the insurance reforms). 
 80. See Cauchi, supra note 79 (describing the various state measures enacted or proposed by 
members of at least forty-seven state legislatures to “limit, alter or oppose selected state or federal 
actions” relating to health reform, but also noting that “because the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the individual coverage mandate, which does not require a state role, the federal law fully applies 
and any contradictory state laws will have no current effect on [ACA] provisions”). Seven states 
have also recently enacted laws intended to create “Interstate Health Compacts.” Id. “[T]hese take 
a first step toward allowing a group of states to join together to establish broad health care 
programs that operate outside of the [ACA] or other federal law. However, these compacts do not 
block [ACA] implementation, and are not yet binding; they will require congressional approval 
because they seek to substitute state control where federal law and regulations exist. These states 
(including Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah and Texas) aim to obtain, 
‘primary responsibility for regulating health care goods and services’ within their boundaries.” Id. 
Some states, including Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Utah, and Wyoming, have taken 
extreme measures, passing legislation barring any state official from assisting the federal 
government with reform efforts. See id. 
 81. Importantly, within these states, there was internal divide about reform, often along party 
lines. See Charles Monaco, In the States, Voices of Determination on Implementing Obamacare, 
PROGRESSIVE STATES NETWORK (July 9, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.progressivestates.org/ 
news/blog/in-the-states-voices-determination-on-implementing-obamacare (describing efforts by 
the Working Group of State Legislators for Health Reform to support reform, including two 
amicus briefs filed by more than five hundred state lawmakers from all fifty states arguing that 
the mandate and Medicaid expansion are constitutional); see also Brief Amici Curiae of State 
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challenges overwhelmingly focused on the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate, but other aspects of the reform—including the 
Medicaid expansion, employer mandate, and state-exchange 
option—were also challenged. 
1.  Claims That Did Not Reach the Supreme Court: 
What NFIB Is Not About 
A number of challenges were raised in the lower courts that 
never gained traction and were easily dismissed for failure to state a 
proper claim. For example, states challenged the employer mandate 
provision as applied to state employers: it would require large state 
employers to offer and automatically enroll state employees in 
federally approved insurance plans or else face substantial penalties 
and assessments.
82
 States alleged that the employer mandate not only 
violated Congress’s interstate commerce power, but also violated the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments by infringing on state sovereignty. 
These claims were easily dismissed based on longstanding precedent 
allowing similar regulation of state employers.
83
 
States also challenged the creation of the health benefit 
exchanges on similar state sovereignty grounds, despite the fact that 
the ACA does not require states to operate an exchange. They argued 
that they were being coerced into operating the exchange “under 
threat of [the federal government] removing or significantly 
curtailing their long-held regulatory authority” that federal regulation 
 
Legislators from the Fifty States et al. Supporting Respondents (Medicaid), Florida v. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 588461 (arguing in favor 
of upholding the ACA). For Iowa and Washington, this dispute resulted in these states appearing 
on both sides of the challenge to health reform. After Washington state’s attorney general, 
Republican Rob McKenna, joined the multistate challenge in Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the state’s Democratic governor, Cris Gregoire, 
criticized the move as not representing the best interests of Washington residents, and the 
Governor filed an amicus brief in support of the reform. Amicus Brief of the Governor of 
Washington Christine Gregoire in Support of Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160228. In 
Iowa, the governor caused the state to join the challenge, but attorney general Tom Miller signed 
an amicus brief, also on behalf of Iowa, in support of health reform. Brief of the States of 
Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160230. 
 82. See Cauchi, supra note 79. 
 83. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2011) (granting summary judgment); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 
(6th Cir. 2011) (denying plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction), abrogated by Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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of insurance markets would “‘displace State authority over a 
substantial segment of intrastate insurance regulation . . . that the 
States have always possessed under the police powers provided in 
the Constitution.’”
84
 These, too, were easily dismissed based on 
longstanding precedent recognizing the federal government’s power 
to regulate in the area of health and safety under its commerce and 
spending powers. The Court viewed this state exchange option as 
precisely the kind of voluntary federal–state partnership used in other 
programs—like Medicaid—and permitted under the Constitution.
85
 
Finally, with respect to the individual mandate, individual 
plaintiffs and religious organizations brought challenges claiming 
infringements on constitutionally protected rights, but these have not 
fared any better.
86
 For example, in Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, the district court 
dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge to the mandate on substantive due 
process grounds.
87
 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ broad 
characterization of fundamental rights as including the “freedom to 
eschew entering into a contract, to direct matters concerning 
dependent children, and to make decisions regarding the acquisition 
and use of medical services,” all of which they claimed the mandate 
 
 84. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1151–54 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing the challenge for failure to state a claim); 
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636–37 (W.D. Va. 2010) (rejecting a Tenth 
Amendment challenge to provisions in the ACA under which the federal government will either 
set up its own exchange to facilitate the regulation and sale of insurance or give states the option 
to set up its own under certain conditions because states are given a choice). 
 85. See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (citations omitted) (analogizing to a case 
upholding similar federal legislation to create a nationwide program to protect the environment 
that created “‘a program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established 
by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured 
to meet their own particular needs,’” and noting that a “wealth of precedent” makes clear that the 
federal government has this power); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (dismissing district plaintiff’s first and second claims for relief and denying 
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction). 
 86. See, e.g., McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1120, 1161–62 (rejecting a substantive due 
process challenge and finding that the mandate does not implicate any of the fundamental rights 
that would merit closer scrutiny); Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 637–47 (rejecting challenges 
to the ACA based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise, 
Establishment, Free Speech and Association, and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 87. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1161–62. 
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would violate.
88
 Rather, the court held that “[f]undamental rights are 
a narrow class of rights involving the right to marry, have children, 
direct the education of those children, marital privacy, contraception, 
bodily integrity, and abortion; and the Supreme Court is ‘very 
reluctant to expand’ that list.”
89
 
2.  Questions Reaching the 
Supreme Court in NFIB 
Plaintiffs had more success challenging the mandate as 
exceeding the Article I powers that Congress used to justify it. 
Congress’s primary justification for the mandate was its power to 
regulate interstate commerce.
90
 This argument seemed to generate 
the most debate among legal scholars and commentators in the media 
because it was considered a novel question that could go either 
way.
91
 This view was reinforced by the split that surfaced between 
the circuit courts of appeals, making Supreme Court review 
inevitable.
92
 
Alternatively, the federal government argued that the mandate 
could also be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power.
93
 
This claim received less attention by commentators and was viewed 
as much weaker by courts; no lower court upheld the mandate on this 
basis because the shared responsibility payment used to enforce the 
mandate was labeled a penalty that must be justified under the 
commerce power, not a tax subject to the broader power to tax and 
spend for the general welfare.
94
 Nonetheless, the issue ultimately 
ended up before the Supreme Court. 
 
 88. Id. at 1161 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss at 43–44, McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT)). 
 89. Id. at 1161–62 (quoting Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 90. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2006). 
 91. See, e.g., Mark Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1825, 1827–29 (2011); Stewart, supra note 22; Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a 
Challenge to Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at A10. 
 92. Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding the mandate under the commerce power), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the individual mandate 
exceeded Congress’s commerce power), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 93. Reply Brief for Petitioner (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 21–25, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 748426, at *21–25. 
 94. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1314 (“Beginning with the district court in this 
case, all have found, without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory 
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Finally, the Medicaid challenge also reached the Supreme Court, 
despite the fact that lower courts treated this challenge almost as 
dismissively as the nonsurviving claims described above. Only Judge 
Roger Vinson of the Northern District of Florida, and then the 
Eleventh Circuit on appeal, viewed this claim as plausible enough to 
survive a motion to dismiss, but both ultimately rejected it.
95
 The 
lack of attention to this issue by legal scholars, mainstream media, 
and even jurists affirmed a growing consensus that this claim was not 
viable.
96
 Consequently, it came as quite a surprise to many when the 
Court eventually granted certiorari on the issue. 
These challenges reached the Supreme Court in the case of 
NFIB, and the Court granted certiorari on four questions. As just 
noted, two of the questions focused on the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.
97
 One of the other 
questions was a threshold procedural question that the Court had to 
answer before it could hear the substantive challenge to the mandate: 
whether the challenge was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act 
(“AIA”).
98
 As described further in Part IV.B, the AIA essentially 
prevents taxpayers from bringing suits to challenge a tax before they 
pay it. Like the constitutional question about whether the mandate 
could be justified as an exercise of the taxing power, this question 
turned on whether the proper characterization of the “shared 
responsibility payment” was as a tax or penalty. If the payment was 
properly viewed as a tax, then the AIA would bar plaintiffs from 
challenging it until 2015 (the earliest that a shared responsibility 
payment would be due). Although the federal government did not 
raise this claim at the appellate level, the Court took up the question. 
The Court also granted certiorari on the issue of severability. 
Specifically, plaintiffs argued that if the individual mandate had been 
found unconstitutional, the entire law would have to fall because the 
mandate was an essential part of the reform and could not be severed 
 
penalty, not a tax.”). But see infra note 160 (citing articles that argued that the taxing power was 
either an equally viable or even stronger justification for upholding the mandate prior to NFIB). 
 95. Id. at 1240–41. 
 96. See infra Part III. But see infra note 162 (noting an exception to the dominant scholarly 
discourse, which viewed the spending power as escaping meaningful Tenth Amendment limits). 
 97. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 98. Id. at 2582. 
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from the Act.
99
 The severability question argued in the lower courts, 
as well as the specific question on which the Court granted certiorari, 
assumed that the issue would arise because of the mandate being 
found unconstitutional.
100
 As described further in Parts IV and V, 
however, because the mandate was held constitutional, the Court 
ultimately had to consider the severability question in light of its 
Medicaid holding. 
III.  THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE 
IN THE HEALTH REFORM DEBATE 
Two themes have pervaded the dominant narrative in the health 
reform debate. First, in the legal debates on the mandate, the most 
vocal opponents of reform have staked out their position as 
protectors of federalism, while casting those who defend federal 
power as nationalists who look to the federal government to solve 
every problem.
101
 These federalism-based concerns derive from the 
structure of our government as one of dual sovereignty, in which the 
federal government’s power is limited and arises from specific 
enumerated powers in Article I of the Constitution, and the states are 
granted plenary power to regulate. The Tenth Amendment, which 
provides that all rights not expressly granted to the federal 
government are otherwise retained by the states and the people, is 
viewed by some as an important check on federal power.
102
 In this 
narrative, federalists not only are concerned with fidelity to the 
constitutional principles of limited government as necessary for 
protecting states’ rights, but they also see states’ rights as a proxy for 
individual liberty.
103
 Federal power is viewed as an inherent threat to 
 
 99. Reply Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability at 18, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 
S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400), 2012 WL 864595 at *18. 
 100. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (granting certiorari limited to the issue 
of severability presented by Question 3 of the petition). Question 3 for Petition No. 11-400 
focused on whether the mandate, if held unconstitutional, could be severed from the rest of the 
law. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-
398). 
 101. See generally Leonard, supra note 68 (discussing the rhetoric of federalism as states’ 
response to the ACA); Mario Loyola, Trojan Horse: Federal Manipulation of State Governments 
and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Doctrine of Federalism, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 113 (2011) 
(discussing the tension between nationalism and federalism). 
 102. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 103. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 22. 
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states and individual liberty, and opposition to reform protects these 
federalist principles. 
Second, the narrative leading up to NFIB focused largely on the 
mandate as a valid exercise of the commerce power. Disconnected 
from the rest of reform, the mandate proved to be an easy target for 
attack. As a result, messages about how reform would actually serve 
federalism interests were diluted. Finally, the focus on the commerce 
power meant that the scope and limits of the federal government’s 
power to tax and spend as tools for insurance expansion went 
underexplored prior to NFIB. 
A.  Safeguarding Federalism by 
Limiting Federal Power 
1.  The Political Narrative 
Politically, opponents of reform have used the rhetoric of 
federalism to justify their attempts to undermine healthcare reform. 
They paint reform as a federal takeover of healthcare, using terms 
like “Obamacare” and inflammatory rhetoric about how the mandate 
will lead to the destruction of civilization as we know it.
104
 Indeed 
some of this rhetoric even made its way into legal briefs and court 
decisions, making dire predictions of a parade of horribles that would 
result if the mandate were to be upheld: 
[T]he federal government will have the absolute and 
unfettered power to create complex regulatory schemes to 
fix every perceived problem imaginable and to do so by 
ordering private citizens to engage in affirmative acts, under 
penalty of law, such as taking vitamins, losing weight, 
joining health clubs, buying a GMC truck, or purchasing an 
AIG insurance policy, among others. The term “Nanny 
 
 104. See Leonard, supra note 68, at 820–21 (noting the partisan rhetoric that has accompanied 
state resistance to health reform); Stewart, supra note 22 (describing how a video title “Wheat, 
Weed and Obamacare: How the Commerce Clause Made Congress All-Powerful” was used to 
cast defenders of the government’s power to enact the ACA as creating “an unlimited, amorphous 
government that can make us do whatever it wants,” and how broccoli became the defining 
symbol of this power); see also REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE, HOUSE REPUBLICAN 
RESPONSES TO OBAMACARE 2 (2010), available at http://rsc.jordan.house.gov/uploadedfiles 
/rsc_solutions_in_response_to_obamacare_sept2010.pdf (describing a “Democrats’ government 
takeover of health care” and passage of “Obamacare” as a “monstrosity of a law”). 
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State” does not even begin to describe what we will have 
wrought if in fact the Health Care Reform Act falls within 
any imaginable governmental authority. To be sure, George 
Orwell’s 1984 will be just the primer for our new civics.
105
 
These arguments reflect a recurring theme of federal power as a 
threat to individual liberty, which has been explained in varied ways 
as based on an individual’s right to make his/her own decisions, to be 
free from compulsory participation in a socialized medical system, 
and to be free from infringements on religious liberty.
106
 States’ 
resistance to reform centered on the mandate despite the fact that the 
mandate did not directly implicate their interests. In this narrative, 
states’ objections were premised on their role in protecting their 
residents’ liberty.
107
 
Another theme reflected in these arguments is the idea that 
reform essentially steps on the states’ turf. States used this to explain 
their vehement opposition to the health benefit exchanges and the 
individual mandate—despite the fact that the exchanges are optional 
and that the federal government has a long history of creating health 
policy.
108
 States portrayed themselves not only as fighting for their 
own sovereign power, but also as protectors of the people’s ability to 
govern themselves.
109
 This notion of a sphere of state regulation that 
should be off-limits to federal power was also the basis on which 
 
 105. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Brief in Support at 17–18, Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2011) (No. 2:10-cv-11156). 
 106. See, e.g., Richard M. Salsman, A Finalized Path to Full, Socialized Medicine in 
America—Thanks to Conservatives, FORBES MAGAZINE (June 28, 2012) http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/richardsalsman/2012/06/28/a-finalized-path-to-full-socialized-medicine-in-america-thanks-
to-conservatives; Jedidiah Purdy & Neil Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum 
Coverage Provision, Mill’s “Harm Principle,” and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J.L. AND 
MED. 374, 376–79 (2012); see also supra Part II.B.1 (detailing legal challenges to healthcare 
reform). 
 107. See, e.g., Cauchi, supra note 79 (providing an overview of various state nullification 
laws). In Wyoming, a proposed constitutional amendment “states that residents have the right to 
make their own health care decisions, while ‘any person may pay, and a health care provider may 
accept, direct payment for health care without imposition of penalties or fines for doing so.’ [It] 
[a]lso provides that the state ‘shall act to preserve these rights from undue governmental 
infringement.’” Id. (internal citations omitted) In Tennessee, a statute declares a “public policy 
that every person within the state ‘shall be free to choose or to decline to choose any mode of 
securing health care services without penalty or threat of penalty;’ [and] requires that no state or 
local public official, employee, or agent ‘shall act to impose, collect, enforce, or effectuate any 
penalty in this state.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 108. Brief of State Respondents as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–12, Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
 109. Id. 
  
570 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:541 
 
hopeful Republican candidate Mitt Romney tried to distinguish the 
reform enacted in Massachusetts under his leadership from 
“Obamacare.”
110
 
The problem with this political narrative is that it does not 
reflect a realistic understanding of the legal scope of federal power or 
the federal–state balance critical to existing health policy. As noted 
in Part II.B, lower courts rejected individual rights-based claims, as 
well as state claims based on antiquated notions of a uniquely state 
sphere of regulatory power. Rather, the only viable challenge to 
reform on the private side was to the individual mandate and whether 
Congress exceeded the Article I powers it used to justify the 
mandate: the power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to 
tax and spend.
111
 Since 1937, these powers have been successfully 
used by the federal government to vastly expand its regulatory reach 
into almost every area affecting one’s daily life, including labor, 
education, the environment, public safety, and, of course, healthcare 
financing and delivery.
112
 
This expansion does not mean that there are no limits on federal 
power. But the absolutist rhetoric in the political narrative has not 
accurately reflected these limits. Federalism-based concerns also 
played a prominent role among legal scholars weighing in on the 
health reform debate, but their arguments reflected a more nuanced 
discussion of the proper balance of federal–state power. 
2.  The Legal Narrative 
Framing federalism as a “choice between federal and state 
action [as] simply binary”—with states and the federal government 
having “exclusive” powers—has long been rejected, even by 
scholars professing federalist concerns.
113
 Yet, these scholars insist 
that our federalism structure creates a “preference” for decentralized 
 
 110. Robert I. Field, Obamacare v. Romneycare: Is There a Difference?, PHILLY.COM 
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/fieldclinic/Obamacare-vs-Romneycare-Is-
there-a-difference.html. 
 111. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2584–91. 
 112. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-
Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 888–94 (2005). 
 113. See Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out? Federal 
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 207 
(2011). 
  
Winter 2013] SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM 571 
decision making and a “presumption” against federal regulation.
114
 A 
number of theories have been offered to justify this presumption. 
One of the most common is that limits on federal power foster local 
experimentation and thus innovation.
115
 Another is that state 
sovereignty ensures that decisions impacting people’s lives will be 
made at the state level, ensuring better local participation and clear 
political accountability.
116
 This, in turn, is viewed as enabling people 
to protect themselves and thus their liberty. For example, Baker and 
Berman assert: 
A state’s freedom from federal interference, like an 
individual’s freedom from governmental restrictions on 
expression or private choices, is a freedom to make choices, 
not just a freedom to choose wisely. That is, federalism, 
including judicially enforced limits on Congress’s spending 
power, seeks to create a space within which a subnational 
political community can make choices about how to govern 
itself without interference from the national government. 
This is out of respect not for the autonomy or dignity of 
states qua states, but for the capacity of communities at a 
subnational level to exercise political self-governance.
117
 
This link between state sovereignty and individual liberty reflects a 
liberty-based view of federalism that has animated arguments against 
the mandate as a violation of our system of limited government, 
which is legally distinct from objections grounded in individual 
rights-based claims.
118
 
 
 114. Id. at 202 (“This federalist structure supports a general, albeit rebuttable, presumption 
that any given policy question should be addressed by state governments.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2010). 
 116. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 581, 632–33 (2010) 
(explaining why allowing the federal government to use the taxing power to impose the mandate 
despite not calling it a tax initially proves that “the individual insurance mandate was designed to 
obviate political accountability” that would normally curb government excess). 
 117. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should 
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 
IND. L.J. 459, 479–80 (2003). 
 118. See, e.g., id.; Barnett, supra note 116, at 626–27, 632–33. Barnett goes even further to 
propose an “anti-commandeering principle” of federalism that applies to individuals, as well as 
states: 
As we have seen, the anti-commandeering cases that limit the commerce power of 
Congress were ultimately grounded by the Supreme Court in the text of the Tenth 
Amendment. Yet the letter of . . . [it] is not limited to states. . . . As Justice Thomas has 
written, the Tenth Amendment “avoids taking any position on the division of power 
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Even scholars who articulate federalism-based concerns about 
health reform acknowledge the potential benefits of federal action 
that can be consistent with our system of dual sovereignty.
119
 There 
are two prominent theories proposed to explain when federal action 
is desirable according to, and consistent with, federalist principles—
cooperative federalism and collective-action federalism. Cooperative 
federalism reflects the idea that the federal and state governments 
often view their powers as complementary, working together to solve 
problems that may implicate local and national interests.
120
 This 
often occurs through the federal government’s spending power: it 
offers states funding to encourage states to work with the federal 
government, according to some set of standards or expectations 
established through conditions attached to the funding.
121
 Indeed the 
federal government’s longstanding partnership with states in 
Medicaid is seen as a prototypical example of this.
122
 The ACA’s 
approach to the health benefit exchanges is another example: federal 
funding is offered to states that want to create their own state 
exchanges, and federal subsidies are used to encourage and empower 
 
between the state governments and the people of the States” . . . . In this way, . . . [it] 
recognizes popular as well as state sovereignty. 
Id. at 626–27 (emphasis in original). See also Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: 
Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare 
Litigation and Beyond, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288, 289 (2012) (describing federalism-based 
objections to reform as reflecting a view that “federalism exists for reasons other than efficiency 
of regulation and particularly that the Founders created the federal structure for the protection of 
individual liberty,” and referring to this view as “libertarian federalism”). 
 119. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 113, at 207–12; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A 
Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 718 
(2002) (agreeing that a contemporary originalist approach is consistent with most, but not all, 
modern legislation). Pushaw later argued that even under this broad interpretation the mandate is 
unconstitutional. Loyola Hosts Debate on Health Care Mandate, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS: 
LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL, LOS ANGELES FACULTY BLOG (Mar. 10, 2011), http://llsblog 
.lls.edu/faculty/2011/03/loyola-hosts-debate-on-healthcare-mandate.html. Defenders of reform 
acknowledge some limits, but understand these limits to allow a great deal of room for federal 
regulation consistent with our constitution. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 115, at 5 (applying a 
“contemporary originalist” approach to find a collective-action theory of federalism that explains 
the modern regulatory state and supports the constitutionality of the mandate). Others have 
argued that the Tenth Amendment should not be understood to limit the federal spending power. 
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 89 (2001). 
 120. See Adler, supra note 113, at 207–12. 
 121. See Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 93–96. 
 122. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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individuals to buy health insurance. The ACA’s structure is the 
hallmark of cooperative federalism: it combines the benefits of 
federal funding with state flexibility and oversight.
123
 
Collective-action federalism views federal action as a legitimate 
method to solve problems that may seem local in nature, but which 
have broader implications and which states are either unwilling to 
solve or incapable of solving on their own.
124
 Health reform has been 
justified under this theory. The funding and blueprint for exchanges 
create a platform that can enhance states’ ability and willingness to 
solve the growing problem of the uninsured and rising healthcare 
costs.
125
 
Some view the question of the mandate’s constitutionality as 
reflecting a tension between theories of cooperative and collective-
action federalism used to justify the mandate on the one hand, and 
the liberty-based view of federalism used to attack its 
constitutionality on the other.
126
 However, some scholars criticize the 
way each of these theories is applied to the constitutional question in 
the first instance. 
For example, scholars have argued that a liberty-based theory of 
federalism that views federal intervention as inherently threatening to 
liberty is an empty theory that does not reflect an appreciation for 
what people need to actually realize liberty. Brennan makes this 
point in his critique of Barnett’s liberty-based argument against the 
mandate: 
 
 123. See Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health 
Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266 (2011) 
(“[T]he [ACA] entrusts large swaths of its implementation to the states.”). 
 124. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory 
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115–16 (2010) (arguing that Article I § 8 generally 
should be understood to authorize Congress’s additional powers to address collective-action 
problems and that this theory should inform the Court’s understanding of the division of powers 
between the federal government in states, which has lead the authors to propose replacing the 
distinction between economic and noneconomic activity with the distinction between collective 
and individual choice by states). 
 125. See Moncrieff, supra note 118, 288–91; Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: 
Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 29, 29–34 (2012); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting that the 
mandate is necessary to deal with the collective-action problem of the national economic 
implications of the growing number of uninsured who are “free riders” in a system that 
guarantees emergency care and where states cannot resolve the problem on their own). 
 126. Moncrieff, supra note 118, at 289 (citations omitted) (“According to this view, there is 
inherent value to state power that ought to be preserved against national encroachments.”). 
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Barnett wants us—indeed, wants the Supreme Court—to 
begin from a presumption of liberty and, what he takes to be 
its correlate, a presumption against regulation. Leaving 
aside for the moment the unstated justifications for those 
presumptions, however, we should note that a presumption 
in favor of liberty does not itself entail an absence of 
regulation. For example, some individuals may not be 
“free” to be healthy unless they obtain medical care. These 
same individuals may not be able to obtain medical care 
unless they have health insurance. And they may on 
occasion not have health insurance unless regulations 
compel them to buy it. The category of “liberty” is not 
exhausted by negative liberty, or freedom from interference; 
it also includes positive liberty, or freedom to act or be in a 
certain way. The freedom to be healthy may be enhanced by 
regulation, and this apparently is what Congress thought 
when it passed [the ACA].
127
 
Indeed, a number of scholars have argued generally for a more robust 
definition of liberty that not only contains negative rights but also 
acknowledges the importance of a positive right to basic needs, 
including the right to health, which gives meaning to this notion of 
liberty.
128
 Moreover, those knowledgeable about health insurance 
markets have offered compelling arguments for why federal reform 
is necessary to remove market impediments that prevent individuals 
from accessing the healthcare so critical for realizing the promise of 
liberty.
129
 
 
 127. Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, and the Ends of Good 
Government: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1641 (2011) 
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 128. For scholars arguing more specifically that the mandate is consistent with, and critical 
for, a more robust theory of liberty that includes the right to health, refer to NORM DANIELS, JUST 
HEALTH CARE 36–58 (1985); Larry Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care, 39 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 7, 9 (1994); Hoffman, supra note 28, at 40–41; Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than 
We Knew, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
archives/2012/aug/16/bigger-victory-we-knew/?pagination=false. 
 129. Some argue that Congress is too restrained and will need to act more boldly and 
centralize more functions in order to better achieve goals of insurance market reform. Moncrieff 
& Lee, supra note 123, at 266 (“[T]he Act entrusts large swaths of its implementation to the 
states. This Article argues, from a purely functional perspective, that the federalist structure in the 
ACA is a mistake. Healthcare regulation in the modern age should be national project entrusted 
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On the other side of the debate, scholars objecting to greater 
federal regulation of healthcare raise concerns about how theories of 
cooperative and collective-action federalism work in practice. 
Cooperative federalism justifications for federal spending in 
healthcare have been dismissed based on assumptions that the federal 
government’s use of its funding is inherently coercive and usurps 
state authority.
130
 For example, Loyola challenges the 
characterization of Medicaid as the prototypical example of 
cooperative federalism, saying that the Medicaid expansion 
provisions “show how illusory state ‘prerogative’ really is in the 
conditional federal grants context.”
131
 Adler similarly criticizes the 
Medicaid expansion, describing the problem of political “lock-in” 
that makes it effectively impossible for states to opt out of Medicaid 
altogether.
132
 
Some acknowledge the potential benefit of cooperative federal 
action to solve collective-action problems, but they define the 
benefits so narrowly, or make flawed assumptions about the 
countervailing costs of federal action, that the scope of federal power 
they would deem legitimate is severely limited. For example, in 
rejecting the collective-action justification for health reform, Adler 
acknowledges only limited efficiency gains from certain kinds of 
federal action, such as data collection or economies of scale that 
could enable firms to offer standardized products throughout the 
nation.
133
 The health and financial benefits expected from health 
reform do not meet his criteria for the kind of benefits that would 
 
solely to the central government.”). The Moncrieff and Lee also note that “[p]art of the reason 
that lawmakers have chosen ‘cooperative federalism’—or this disjointed mess—is that Congress 
is structured to be protective of states’ interests.” Id. at 268. 
 130. See, e.g., Loyola, supra note 101, at 116–17 (describing the conditional federal grants in 
the ACA as an “example[] of ‘cooperative federalism’ [that is] incompatible with ‘the structural 
framework of dual sovereignty,’” and stating that “[w]herever federal programs confront states 
with a choice between subordinating local preferences to federal ones, on the one hand, and 
giving up either revenue or regulatory autonomy on the other, there is coercion”). Yet states’ 
opposition to establishing health benefit exchanges (and consequently getting federal funds to do 
so) undermines this notion of inherent coercion. See, e.g., State Exchange Profiles: Missouri, 
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. HEALTH REFORM SOURCE, http://healthreform.kff.org/State-
Exchange-Profiles/missouri (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (“[I]n April 2012, the Missouri 
legislature rejected a $50 million federal grant to upgrade the state’s Medicaid information 
technology system because lawmakers saw it as a possible framework for building an 
exchange.”). 
 131. See Loyola, supra note 101, at 134. 
 132. See Adler, supra note 113, at 215. 
 133. Id. at 205–06, 218. 
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justify federal action.
134
 Moreover, Adler seems to assume the 
inevitability of certain costs of intervention—namely, lack of state 
experimentation and political accountability—that he says would not 
outweigh any benefit.
135
 These assumptions animate his criticism of 
reform generally, but his criticism of the Medicaid expansion is 
particularly revealing. 
Adler characterizes the Medicaid expansion as “dramatically 
reshap[ing] federal-state relations” and characterizes these reforms as 
“increasing pressure on state governments to follow the federal 
government’s lead.”
136
 As evidence of this conclusion, Adler relies 
on an article about the Tennessee Medicaid Managed Care program 
(“TennCare”) to make a very specific, and uncontroversial, point—
the phenomenon of political “lock-in.”
137
 Yet, this article’s authors 
present a far more nuanced picture of the state’s power than is 
reflected in Adler’s critique and that undermines Adler’s conclusion 
that federal action impedes state experimentalism and 
accountability.
138
 
In the TennCare article, authors Blumstein and Sloan describe 
how Tennessee obtained a federal waiver for a Medicaid 
demonstration program in 1993 so that it could establish a Medicaid 
managed care plan.
139
 Despite its concerns over Medicaid costs, 
Tennessee decided to experiment with managed care as a way to 
increase healthcare coverage of Medicaid beneficiaries and non-
 
 134. Id. at 216. 
 135. See id. at 202, 207. 
 136. Id. at 199. 
 137. Id. at 215 (citing to James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through 
Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 125, 141–42 (2000)). 
 138. I am not claiming that Blumstein and Sloan would say there is no federalism problem 
with how the Medicaid expansion is being implemented. In fact, James Blumstein, Professor of 
Law at Vanderbilt University School of Law, filed an amicus brief recognizing the flexibility 
inherent in much of the traditional Medicaid program, but arguing that the expansion as 
structured under the ACA does not leave states with a meaningful choice about whether to 
participate in the expansion. Brief of James F. Blumstein as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners (Medicaid Issue) at 20–29, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. 
Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 195306, at *20–29. Blumstein does not suggest the 
expansion be struck down, however; he argued that treating the expansion as a “new program” to 
which states have the choice to opt in would avoid the coercion problem. Id. at *36. This is the 
compromise the Supreme Court ultimately struck in the case. See Part V.B. 
 139. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 137, at 129–32. 
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Medicaid-eligible Tennesseans who were either uninsured or 
uninsurable.
140
 The authors describe the results of TennCare’s 
experiment: 
[Since implementation, it] has increased coverage beyond 
its Medicaid core by nearly a half-million people, and has 
achieved its access goals while spending less than the 
negotiated budget neutrality cap . . . . The 1997 Balanced 
Budget Act institutionalized TennCare’s mandated 
managed care approach by authorizing states, without 
seeking a waiver, to require Medicaid beneficiaries to . . . 
receive medical care benefits through managed care entities. 
TennCare, therefore, represents a major state-initiated 
healthcare reform effort.
141
 
Thus, Tennessee viewed federal funding as leverage for it to 
find a creative way to care for more citizens while reducing cost. 
Moreover, TennCare’s experiment provided a model for reform that 
other states followed, leading to changes in federal law to make such 
reforms easier to accomplish.
142
 The bottom line is that with federal 
help, states drove reform; they were not passive recipients of federal 
mandates imposed from on high. 
Baker and Berman’s critique of federal healthcare regulation 
reveals flaws similar to Adler’s. In an article written prior to the 
ACA, Baker and Berman attack the cooperative federalism at work 
in the Medicaid program. They insist that “judicially enforced 
limitations on the spending power increase and preserve diversity 
among the states within the realm of what is constitutionally 
permitted, thereby ultimately increasing aggregate social welfare.”
143
 
 
 140. Id. at 130. 
 141. Id. at 131. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 470–71 (footnote omitted). To be fair, in the text 
where this assumption is developed, authors use some qualifying language: 
[S]tate-by-state variation will almost always satisfy more people than would the 
imposition of a uniform national policy, and will almost always therefore increase 
aggregate social welfare. . . . [S]tate-by-state diversity will generally allow government 
to accommodate the preferences of a greater proportion of the electorate, as long as 
those preferences are unequally distributed geographically. And . . . this is likely to 
mean that the imposition of national uniformity in the absence of consensus will reduce 
aggregate social welfare relative to the existence of state-by-state diversity. 
Id. at 471 (emphasis added). However, in a footnote, the authors explain this qualification is 
necessary because of legitimate differences in how to measure welfare; they do not acknowledge 
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And they criticize “advocates of national power [as] often giv[ing] 
too little weight to the value of self-governance by state political 
communities.”
144
 Yet these criticisms ignore state flexibility in the 
law itself, as well as contrary evidence drawn from the 
implementation of Medicaid reforms in practice. In particular, they 
do not consider accounts by legal scholars, policy analysts, and 
social scientists describing in detail how Medicaid managed care 
reforms have provided an opportunity for increased public 
participation in shaping health policy at the local level.
145
 This 
opportunity for local participation is due in part to federal laws 
requiring consultation of stakeholders, but it is also due to the fact 
that these reforms are state driven. 
Thus, in challenging cooperative and collective-action based 
theories for federal action in healthcare, scholars make, at best, 
incomplete and, at worst, inaccurate assumptions about the effects of 
federal action on states and individuals. These assumptions are, in 
turn, used to support a presumption against regulation and to 
reinforce a narrative of reform as a theoretical threat to federalism, 
without regard to how reform might further federalism goals in 
practice. Finally, some legal scholars have undermined a more 
nuanced and thoughtful federalist critique of reform by adopting 
oversimplified and sensational descriptions of the Act as a 
“dramatic[] reshap[ing] [of] federal–state relations in health care 
policy” or as a “health care revolution” that “radically alter[s] the 
relationship between individuals and the government.”
146
 
Consequently, federalism-based objections in both the political and 
legal arenas have tended to obscure the reality that the ACA, 
structurally and functionally, creates a platform that empowers state 
experimentation and gives individuals greater choice in the market—
 
how federal funding has already sparked state diversity and innovation in the Medicaid program, 
and how federal law can help ensure public participation and local accountability. Id. at n.64. 
 144. Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 479. 
 145. See, e.g., COLLEEN M. GROGAN & MICHAEL K. GUSMANO, HEALTHY VOICES, 
UNHEALTHY SCIENCE: ADVOCACY AND HEALTH POLICY FOR THE POOR (2007) (examining 
Connecticut’s Medicaid advisory board process, and providing prescriptive advice for creating a 
participatory process in state level health policymaking that meaningfully addresses the health 
concerns for the poor and dispossessed). 
 146. See Adler, supra note 113, at 199–200. 
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a reality that undermines the federalism-based justifications for 
limiting federal power.
147
 
B.  Focus on the Mandate and 
the Commerce Clause Debate 
The federalism narrative in the mainstream media and in much 
legal commentary sharpened around the Commerce Clause challenge 
to the individual mandate. This may seem odd because the most 
obvious “threat” to states’ rights, or the legal question that most 
directly implicated federal-state boundaries, was the Medicaid 
challenge. States’ interests were much less clear in the private 
insurance reform context, where the challenge centered on the 
individual mandate. Nonetheless, Medicaid and the power to tax and 
spend were largely absent from the public debate. 
1.  The Mandate and the Parade of Horribles: 
An Easy Target 
One reason that the debate focused on the mandate was that it 
was an easy political target. It proved to be a compelling rhetorical 
example of government forcing its way into our personal decisions, 
which played into fears of big government. As already noted, 
President Obama had disclaimed it as a candidate and the mandate 
was controversial, even among reform supporters. For states, the 
individual mandate was thought to be a powerful weapon in attacks 
on reform.
148
 Legally, the mandate was understood to be an 
unprecedented exercise of federal power,
149
 and opponents viewed 
this as a compelling invitation for the Court to impose greater limits 
on federal power. This hope was understandable in light of the 
narrowing of federal power by the Rehnquist Court,
150
 and 
predictions that such narrowing would continue under the Roberts 
Court.
151
 Finally, by their own admission, lawmakers viewed the 
 
 147. Id. In fairness, this may be due in part to the newness of the exchanges and the fact that 
many details are still to be decided. However, even a cursory review of the number and character 
of the decisions that are already clearly delegated to the states challenges these assumptions. 
 148. See Leonard, supra note 78, at 73. 
 149. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). 
 150. See Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 460; Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 89. 
 151. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Can They Kill Health Care in Court?, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22, 
2010, 8:37 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/03/23/how-to-kill-health-care-in-
court.html. 
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mandate as “essential” to the other reforms included in the ACA.
152
 
As a legal matter, this meant that striking down the mandate could 
jeopardize the entire Act. 
Although the legal question headed to the Supreme Court was 
whether the mandate was unconstitutional because Congress 
exceeded the scope of its enumerated powers under the Constitution, 
the idea that the mandate infringed on liberty resonated more 
strongly among reform opponents. Liberty-based theories of 
federalism were used to try to persuade people that upholding the 
mandate would empower the federal government to try to control 
every aspect of our lives.
153
 The focus on the mandate allowed those 
opposed to reform to create an overly simplistic narrative about a 
federal takeover of healthcare that threatened individual liberty and 
reinforced assumptions that states and others challenging the 
mandate were acting as protectors of this liberty. The mandate was 
floating out on its own in this narrative—disconnected from the rest 
of the private or public reforms that provided the necessary context 
for understanding how the ACA could actually further, not threaten, 
federalism principles. 
2.  The Medicaid Expansion: 
A More Formidable Federalist Foe 
There were many reasons why Medicaid did not get as much 
attention as the mandate. First, unlike the mandate, Medicaid has 
been around a long time and the expansion did not appear to create a 
novel question of law that would generate exciting commentary and 
debate. Moreover, even though a significant number of people had 
benefited from or held favorable attitudes toward Medicaid, many 
were still unaware of some basic facts about it.
154
 The concept of an 
 
 152. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591–92. 
 153. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 116; Moncrieff, supra note 118; Stewart, supra note 22. 
 154. See HENRY J. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 3, 5 
(2011) [hereinafter Kaiser Health Tracking Poll], available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls 
/upload/8190-F.pdf (describing the results of a public poll on the importance of Medicaid where 
almost half of the participants said that Medicaid is “very” or “somewhat” important). Although 
this poll reflects significant support for Medicaid, it does not necessarily evidence widespread 
understanding of the federal–state partnership in Medicaid. For example, out of 1,203 adults 
polled, in the part of the Kaiser Health Tracking Poll that asked about block grants, participants 
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individual mandate is pretty simple; the massive legislative and 
regulatory intricacies that shaped the federal–state interaction in 
Medicaid made it much harder to understand, and thus attack. There 
also was not as clear a divide between the support and opposition to 
the expansion. As noted in Part II, despite the fact that twenty-six 
state officials signed on to the challenge, there was widespread 
support for the expansion among lawmakers in these and other states. 
Unfortunately, its supporters were not always as vocal.
155
 
More significantly, however, challenges to the Medicaid 
program did not fit the simplistic narrative that reform threatened 
federalism principles. Courts had consistently affirmed the spending 
power as a tool of cooperative federalism, consistent with the spirit 
of dual sovereignty embodied in the Constitution, and Medicaid in 
particular has been the prototypical example. Moreover, state 
opposition to a Medicaid expansion that was extremely generously 
funded by the federal government, and that would have helped 
ensure healthcare access for the very poor who have been excluded 
from public and private insurance, did not present a compelling or 
sympathetic picture of states. It actually undermined the picture of 
states as protectors of individual liberty, or at least highlighted an 
empty notion of liberty adopted by many reform challengers. 
Finally, states’ concerns regarding Medicaid were far more 
nuanced than the objection to the expansion. In fact, their more 
immediate concerns related to the effect of the individual mandate on 
existing Medicaid eligibles.
156
 Despite anti-welfare-program rhetoric 
that has painted people as expecting government to take care of all of 
their needs, the reality is that a number of eligible people have not 
enrolled in Medicaid for a variety of reasons—stigma, bureaucracy, 
 
were first given descriptions of the current Medicaid system as well as what the proposed changes 
would mean. Id. at 1–2. 
 155. See, e.g., John E. McDonough, Medicaid’s Moment (Guest Opinion), KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (July 13, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/columns/2011/july/071311mcdonough. 
aspx?referrer=search (“[W]hile Democrats are effusive in their praise of Medicare, their silence in 
response to public attacks on Medicaid has been deafening—during the fight over health reform 
legislation and since.”). Former President Clinton finally mentioned it in his speech at the 
Democratic National Convention, but even then he focused more on how it benefits the middle 
class and poor children with autism. Bill Clinton, Former U.S. President, Remarks at the 
Democratic National Convention (Sept. 5, 2012), (transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com 
/Politics/OTUS/transcript-bill-clintons-democratic-conventionspeech/ 
story?id=17164662). 
 156. See, e.g., Brietta Clark, State Reactions to Medicaid Reforms, HEALTH CARE JUSTICE 
BLOG (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.healthcarejusticeblog.org/2010/03/state_reactions.html. 
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lack of information, or a fear of other consequences.
157
 If the 
mandate leads to increased enrollment of existing eligibles, this will 
cost states much more than the newly eligibles because existing 
eligibles are subject to the traditional federal matching formula under 
the original program.
158
 To the extent state opposition was driven by 
the desire to avoid the costs of covering people to whom states 
already had a legal duty, this would have undermined the picture of 
states as protecting individuals’ liberty interests. 
3.  Regulating Commerce Versus 
the Power to Tax and Spend 
As already noted above, the government’s own framing of the 
constitutional basis for the mandate, as well as the apparent 
consensus developing among lower courts, sharpened the focus of 
federalism-based objections to reform on the scope of federal power 
 
 157. See, e.g., Brietta R. Clark, The Immigrant Health Care Narrative and What It Tells Us 
About the U.S. Health Care System, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 229, 254–56 (2008) (noting that 
immigrants who are eligible for Medicaid may be afraid to seek public health benefits for a 
number of reasons, including the fear of jeopardizing their immigration status or exposing 
undocumented family members to government officials who could have them deported); Brietta 
R. Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic: The Role of Health Literacy in Health Care 
Access, Quality, & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 253, 258–67, 282–83 (2011) (describing the 
problem of poor health literacy, which impacts approximately ninety million people in the U.S, 
and explaining how it impedes people’s ability to process the kind of information used on 
insurance enrollment forms and required to navigate the healthcare system). In their 2010 study, 
John Holahan and Irene Headen note that changes in coverage under the ACA will vary 
depending on how aggressive the federal government and states are in their outreach and 
enrollment campaigns to the public. The study presents an “enhanced scenario,” which reflects 
the kind of aggressive outreach that will be needed to promote more robust participation in 
Medicaid and to further reduce the number of uninsured in this low-income population, as 
compared to the standard scenario. The study predicts that “a new culture of coverage along with 
outreach efforts are likely to yield more participation . . . [by] both those made newly eligible for 
coverage under health reform and eligible for coverage prior to changes in reform.” HOLAHAN & 
HEADEN, supra note 44, at 5. 
 158. HOLAHAN & HEADEN, supra note 44, at 6 (“Under these higher participation 
assumptions, new spending for Medicaid would continue to be mostly federal . . . [but] [t]he share 
of spending borne by the federal government will be somewhat lower under the higher 
participation assumptions, primarily due to higher take-up among those who are eligible under 
pre-PPACA rules. Since the states will receive lower federal matching rates for those previously 
eligible, states will be responsible for a higher share of their costs.”); see also Medi-Cal Could 
Grow to 10.5M Enrollees by 2019, Report Finds, CALIFORNIAHEALTHLINE (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2010/10/27/medical-could-grow-to-105m-enrollees-
by-2019-report-finds.aspx (noting that reform could lead to more than 500,000 currently eligible 
residents to enroll in California’s Medicaid program). 
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under the Commerce Clause. This made sense given the fact that the 
commerce power had been a frequent site for federalism-based 
struggles over the proper balance of federal-state power,
159
 and that 
with few exceptions, scholars focused on the mandate as reviving 
this debate over the commerce power.
160
 
Legal questions involving the taxing and spending powers were 
largely neglected because they were much less controversial. A 
consensus seemed to be developing that the mandate could not be 
justified under the taxing power, but that the Medicaid expansion 
could be easily justified by the spending power.
161
 The test 
 
 159. See Pushaw, Jr., supra note 112, at 888–94 (providing a brief overview of the evolution 
of the Commerce Clause doctrine) (“Congress did not begin to invoke the Commerce Clause to 
enact large-scale legislation until the late nineteenth century. The Court, seeking to protect 
regulatory power over ‘local’ matters, adopted an unduly restrictive definition of ‘commerce’—
buying, selling, and shipping goods—and hence struck down many federal laws dealing with 
activities such as manufacturing and labor. The Court initially applied this jurisprudence to 
invalidate New Deal legislation, which systematically addressed matters formerly left to the 
states, such as agriculture, employment, manufacturing, and banking. This judicial resistance 
ended in 1937, when the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act . . . in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp.”). Over the next several decades, a narrow majority of the Court embraced a 
more expansive view of the Commerce Clause power, which has been used to uphold a vast 
expansion of federal power through laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to a small 
lumber company whose employees engaged in local manufacturing, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which banned racial discrimination in public accommodations, and criminal bans on loan 
sharking. Id.; see also Balkin, supra note 115 (using a lens of “contemporary originalism” to 
explore how the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence has dovetailed with the rise of the 
modern regulatory state); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) (exploring historical documents to establish that the original meaning 
of the Commerce Clause was narrow); Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 119 (arguing that the 
language of the Commerce Clause plausibly lends itself to a broader reading and that this reading 
is preferable to a narrow one). 
 160. See Balkin, supra note 115, at 44. A search of law review articles revealed that many 
more people had written about the Commerce Clause issue than other issues prior to NFIB; see 
also Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
1825, 1827–28 (2011) (noting the sharpening focus on the Commerce Clause in part due to trends 
among lower courts). Even among scholars who addressed the commerce and taxing powers, far 
more emphasis was placed on the commerce power. However, some scholars did focus on the 
taxing argument as a strong justification for the mandate. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness 
of Health-Care Reform, YALE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1856506 (last visited Nov. 8, 2012); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to 
Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/articles.php?article=403; Brian D. Galle, Conditional Taxation 
and the Constitutionality of Health Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/889.pdf. 
 161. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant 
Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513, 527–33 (2012); Mark Hall, 
Individual Versus State Constitutional Rights Under Reform, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1233, 1237–41 
(2010/2011); Leonard, supra note 68, at 787–88, 793; Steven D. Schwinn, The Framers’ 
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governing Congress’s ability to act pursuant to its spending power 
was viewed as extremely easy to satisfy, making this a less viable 
site for enforcing robust limits on federal power. There seemed to be 
a consensus that the spending power was “untouchable” and a 
“loophole” that allowed the federal government to circumvent more 
robust Tenth Amendment limits on other federal powers.
162
 Although 
the taxing power is also quite broad, very few people thought that the 
shared responsibility payment used to enforce the mandate could 
plausibly be viewed as a tax subject to this broad federal power. 
This seemed to lull most people into an expectation that the 
mandate, and not Medicaid, would be the ACA’s Achilles’ heel and 
that the commerce power, not the taxing and spending power, would 
determine the law’s fate. This also meant that legal debates about the 
power to tax and spend, as well as policy discussions about the 
consequences of the ultimate holding, were not nearly as well fleshed 
out as they could have been. Indeed, many people were caught by 
surprise when the Roberts Court upheld the mandate as an exercise 
of the taxing power and upheld only a limited version of the 
expansion due to an unprecedented finding of coercion. 
IV.  UPHOLDING THE MANDATE WITH A TWIST: 
THE TAXING POWER SAVES THE DAY 
Challenges to the ACA centered on whether the individual 
mandate and the Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress’s Article I 
powers. Federalism concerns about limited federal government, state 
 
Federalism and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1071, 1096–97 (2012). But see 
Loyola, supra note 101. 
 162. See Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 460 (“[M]any commentators . . . have proposed 
that Congress should respond to the Rehnquist Court’s states’ rights decisions by using the 
spending power to circumvent those limitations on congressional power.”); see also Mark 
Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 52 
(2003) (describing the Court’s observance of a loophole in which “Congress could induce state 
compliance” using its spending power). But, for a notable exception, see Nicole Huberfeld, Clear 
Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare 
Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441 (2008). Huberfeld describes Arlington Central School District 
Board of Education v. Murphy, a decision rendered by the first Roberts Court, arguing that it may 
become “a benchmark for Spending Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 441. She suggests that Arlington 
“refashioned the foundational clear statement rule to a ‘clear notice’ standard that requires more 
specific statutory language from Congress and that is particularly attuned to the state’s 
viewpoint.” Id. She predicts that “[t]his analytical shift may narrow Congress’s ability to place 
conditions on federal spending.” Id. 
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sovereignty, and individual liberty figured prominently in the Court’s 
consideration of these questions. At the beginning of the opinion, 
Chief Justice Roberts framed the specific constitutional questions as 
arising out of a fundamental and perpetual question about the proper 
scope of federal power in our system of dual sovereignty, where the 
“National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and 
the people retain the remainder.”
163
 Roberts went on to explain the 
important interests served by limiting federal power: 
“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, 
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from 
the diffusion of sovereign power.” . . . Because the police 
power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one 
national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on 
citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller 
governments closer to the governed. The Framers thus 
ensured that powers which “in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the 
people” were held by governments more local and more 
accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.
164
 
The government defended the mandate on two grounds—its 
power to regulate interstate commerce and its taxing power. In 
defining the scope of these powers, Chief Justice Roberts further 
cautioned that they “must be read carefully to avoid creating a 
general federal authority akin to the police power.”
165
 In light of the 
overwhelming focus on the commerce power prior to NFIB, it makes 
sense that the Court began with this issue and that this argument 
received the greater amount of attention by the Justices. 
A.  Why the Mandate Exceeds the Commerce Power: 
The Activity–Inactivity Distinction 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
 
 163. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). The Court noted 
that although the “Federal Government has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, . . . 
it still must show that a constitutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions.” Id. at 2578. 
The Court contrasts this with the “general power of governing, possessed by the States but not by 
the Federal Government, as the ‘police power.’” Id. 
 164. Id. (citations omitted). 
 165. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Indian Tribes.”
166
 The Court has interpreted this to allow Congress to 
regulate “‘the channels of interstate commerce,’ ‘persons or things in 
interstate commerce,’ and ‘those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.’”
167
 This last prong has been understood to give 
Congress expansive power to reach activities that may be local or 
noneconomic in nature but that in the aggregate have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.
168
 
One case that illustrates the breadth of this power is Wickard v. 
Filburn.
169
 In Wickard, the Court upheld a federal law that limited 
the amount of wheat that a local farmer could grow solely for his 
own consumption and not for commerce.
170
 The Court held that 
although growing wheat for consumption is a local activity, Congress 
could reach it based on the concern that the amount of wheat farmers 
grew for their own use would diminish demand and thus have a 
substantial effect on the commercial market for wheat.
171
 In rejecting 
the appellee’s claims that the regulation exceeded the scope of the 
commerce power because such effects were at most “indirect,” the 
Court noted that such questions “are not to be decided by reference 
to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature 
such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the 
actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate 
commerce.”
172
 
The federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce 
has also been understood broadly because the Constitution authorizes 
Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”
173
 Gonzales v. Raich 
is an example of this power’s breadth.
174
 In Raich, the Court upheld 
federal legislation enacted to regulate the interstate market in 
 
 166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 167. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578. 
 168. Id. at 2578–79. 
 169. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Court has described Wickard as “perhaps 
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.” United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
 170. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118–19. 
 171. Id. at 125. 
 172. Id. at 119–20. 
 173. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.18. 
 174. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
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marijuana, but which also prohibited the local possession and 
cultivation of marijuana.
175
 The plaintiffs brought suit seeking an 
exemption from the regulation on the basis that the federal 
government had no power to regulate marijuana that is locally grown 
and consumed.
176
 The Court denied the exemption based on the 
government’s argument that marijuana is a fungible commodity and 
thus could be easily diverted into the interstate market.
177
 Because 
Congress’s attempt to regulate the interstate market would be 
undercut without the ability to regulate intrastate possession and 
consumption, the law was upheld as a necessary and proper aspect of 
the larger regulatory scheme. Indeed, even Justice Scalia in Raich 
recognized the breadth of the necessary and proper clause, noting 
that it “empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its 
[commerce] power[] that are not within its authority to enact in 
isolation.”
178
 
In NFIB, the federal government relied heavily on the expansive 
substantial effects test from Wickard,
179
 as well as the vast discretion 
given to the federal government through the necessary and proper 
clause as understood in Raich, to justify the mandate.
180
 Despite 
acknowledging the breadth of the commerce power, as illustrated by 
Wickard and Raich, however, a majority of the Court concluded that 
the Commerce Clause was not broad enough to permit Congress to 
require individuals to purchase insurance through the individual 
mandate.
181
 
 
 175. Id. at 32–33 (2005) (challenging application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to 
two California residents who suffered from a variety of medical conditions and grew and 
consumed medical marijuana pursuant to the terms of the California’s Compassionate Use Act). 
 176. See Brief for Respondents at 12, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454). 
 177. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
 178. Id. at 37, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the “necessary and proper” power as 
broader than the “substantial effects” test and describing the relevant question as “simply whether 
the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the 
commerce power”). 
 179. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585–86 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) for the 
substantial effects test). 
 180. Id. at 2593. 
 181. Chief Justice Roberts, writing only for himself, reached this conclusion in Part III-A of 
the opinion. Id. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito did not join in any part of the Chief Justice’s opinion, but they agreed the mandate exceeded 
the scope of Congress’s Commerce Power, largely for the same as Chief Justice Roberts. See id. 
at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). See also, Jonathan D. Varat, 
Supreme Court Foreword, October Term 2011: Federalism Points and the Sometime Recognition 
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1.  The Substantial Effects Test 
As part of the ACA, Congress included legislative findings of 
the substantial and harmful commercial effects of the growing 
numbers of uninsured and the uncompensated care problem.
182
 Based 
on lower court decisions, challengers’ briefs, and the Justices’ 
opinions, there does not appear to have been any serious dispute 
about the substantial effect of uninsurance on interstate commerce.
183
 
Rather, five Justices of the Court found the mandate to be a violation 
of the commerce power because of a missing element: activity.
184
 In 
separate opinions, Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters 
(Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) concluded that as 
broad as the federal government’s commerce power may be it does 
not allow the government to compel someone to purchase an 
unwanted product. These Justices found evidence for their 
interpretation of the commerce power as having a threshold activity 
requirement in the constitutional text and precedent. 
For example, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the text of the 
clause limits the government’s power to regulating commerce, which 
“presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be 
regulated.”
185
 He contrasted language used in the Commerce Clause 
with the language of other enumerated powers that expressly gave 
Congress the power to create, like the power to coin money or raise 
 
of Essential Federal Power, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 411, 417 (2013) (“Probably out of pique that 
Chief Justice Roberts was not willing to go nearly as far as they would, the joint dissenters 
conspicuously did not join any aspect of his lead opinion and officially withheld any concurrence 
in his opinion at all, even though the dissent, in at least some respects, essentially mirrored some 
of the Chief Justice’s conclusions and reasoning.”). 
 182. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2). 
 183. See, e.g. id. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (holding that the mandate exceeds the 
commerce power due to lack of “activity” but not disputing the assertion that the failure to obtain 
insurance has a substantial effect on interstate commerce); id. at 2609–18 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (providing a more 
detailed summary of the evidence of the substantial effect on interstate commerce that justifies 
upholding the mandate under the commerce power). 
 184.  Id. at 2586, 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2647–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2647–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
& Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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and support armies.
186
 Moreover, the Chief Justice and the Joint 
Dissenters noted that although no prior case explicitly required 
activity, precedent has made clear that existing activity was 
presumed.
187
 Finally, all five Justices were particularly concerned 
that to hold otherwise would undermine the principle of a limited 
federal government inherent in our dual sovereign system: 
The Government’s theory would erode those limits, 
permitting Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of 
its authority, “everywhere extending the sphere of its 
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex” . . . [and] would give Congress the same license to 
regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the 
relation between the citizen and the Federal Government.
188
 
Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor, criticized this reasoning on several grounds. 
Justice Ginsburg argued that neither precedent nor the text or history 
of the Constitution requires the Commerce Clause to be interpreted 
as having an activity requirement.
189
 Even if there were such a 
requirement, she disagreed with the characterization of the failure to 
purchase insurance as inactivity. Rather, she agreed with the 
government that the inevitability of needing healthcare, coupled with 
laws entitling people to certain kinds of healthcare without regard to 
their ability to pay, means that no one can opt out of the health 
market.
190
 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg cited numerous statistics 
showing that need for healthcare may be unpredictable but not 
unavoidable.
191
 These unique attributes of the healthcare system and 
 
 186. Id. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The language of the Constitution reflects the 
natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already something to be 
regulated.”). 
 187. Id. at 2587 (“As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce power 
have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching 
‘activity.’ It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them.”); id. at 2647-48 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 2589 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2648 (“[I]f every person comes within the 
Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate by the simple reason that he will one day 
engage in commerce, the idea of a limited Government power is at an end”). 
 189. Id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 190. Id. at 2618–20. 
 191. Id. at 2610–11, 2618. 
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the significant cost of healthcare also mean that healthcare delivery 
and financing decisions are necessarily linked.
192
 
Thus, Ginsburg argued, an activity–inactivity distinction was 
meaningless because everyone is “active in the market for health 
care.”
193
 For this reason, Ginsburg agreed with the government’s 
characterization of the failure to get insurance as a decision to “self-
insure” that is properly subject to commercial regulation because it 
inevitably results in costly, uncompensated care.
194
 She rejected the 
characterization of the mandate as a government compelled 
“purchase of a discrete, unwanted product” and instead viewed it as 
Congress “defining the terms on which individuals pay for an 
interstate good they consume.”
195
 
2.  The Necessary and Proper Clause 
In considering the government’s claim that the mandate was an 
essential part of a broader regulatory scheme to regulate commerce, 
the Chief Justice did not question whether the mandate was in fact a 
“necessary” part of the regulatory framework that required insurance 
companies to issue insurance and prohibited them from engaging in 
individualized risk rating, and the Joint Dissenters devoted only three 
lines of their opinion to speculation that the government could have 
achieved its regulatory goals through other means.
196
 Rather, the 
 
 192. Ginsburg also relied on this uniqueness argument to counter federalist concerns that the 
mandate will lead to a slippery slope of federal mandates. Id. at 2623. But the Chief Justice was 
not persuaded, accusing the federal government and the Justice Ginsburg of engaging in word 
play designed to circumvent practical limits on federal power. Id. at 2587–90 (opinion of Roberts, 
C.J.). 
 193. Id. at 2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). Ginsburg also criticized this “activity–inactivity” distinction as the kind of 
“formalistic nomenclature” rejected in Wickard and a distraction from the real question about the 
link between the challenged regulation and effects on commerce. Id. at 2622 (citing Wickard for 
the proposition that questions of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause “are not to be 
decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as 
‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in 
question upon interstate commerce” (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)). 
 194. Id. at 2622–23. 
 195. Id. at 2620. 
 196. See id. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the Court is very deferential to 
Congress’s determination about what is “necessary” and has upheld laws that are “‘convenient, or 
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise’”); see also id. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (contrasting the 
success in Massachusetts with the mass exodus of insurers from states that attempted to guarantee 
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Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters’ focus was on the importance 
of an activity requirement as a constitutional limit to federal power 
and why the Necessary and Proper Clause could not be used to 
circumvent this requirement.
197
 For example, after explaining how 
deferential the Court has been to Congress on the this prong, the 
Chief Justice emphasized the “proper” part of this clause as an 
important limiting principle on the otherwise expansive reach of this 
provision, noting that laws that are not “consist[ent] with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution[]’ . . . are not ‘proper [means] for 
carrying into Execution’ Congress’s enumerated powers.”
198
 
According to the Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters, such laws 
undermine the structure of government established by the 
Constitution and must be declared unconstitutional. 
In their opinion, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito 
provided a more vivid description of the unchecked federal power 
that would result from allowing the government to mandate 
insurance: 
Congress has impressed into service third parties, healthy 
individuals who could be but are not customers of the 
relevant industry, to offset the undesirable consequences of 
the regulation. . . . If Congress can reach out and command 
even those furthest removed from an interstate market to 
participate in the market, then the Commerce Clause 
becomes a font of unlimited power, or in Hamilton’s words, 
“the hideous monster whose devouring jaws . . . spare 
neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor 
profane.”
199
 
 
access to affordable insurance coverage without a mandate). In fact, challengers relied on the 
characterization of the mandate as “necessary” to the larger regulatory framework in arguing that 
other parts of the reform could not be severed from the mandate and thus would have to fall with 
the mandate if found unconstitutional. But see id. at 2644–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, 
JJ., dissenting) (questioning the necessity of the mandate and suggesting alternatives). 
 197. Id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the necessary and proper clause “does 
not license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond those 
specifically enumerated”); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original) (explaining that “the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help achieve the ends 
Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce”). 
 198. Id. at 2592 (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting McCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. 
316, 421 (1819) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 899 (1997)). 
 199. Id. at 2645 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
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Considering the prominent role that such concerns played in 
these Justices’ decision to find the mandate unconstitutional under 
the commerce power, it was no doubt a surprise to his conservative 
colleagues when Chief Justice Roberts joined Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan to uphold the mandate as a 
constitutional exercise of the taxing power. 
B.  The Mandate as a Constitutional 
Exercise of the Taxing Power: 
The Tax–Penalty Distinction 
The Constitution provides that Congress may “lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”
200
 
This power to tax and spend has been interpreted as extremely 
broad—much broader in fact than the commerce power. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that this “grant gives the Federal 
Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot 
directly regulate,” which means that the “Federal Government may 
enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise 
control.”
201
 Thus, the fact that the federal government cannot 
mandate people to buy insurance under its commerce power is not 
determinative of the federal government’s power to tax those who do 
not have insurance in the form of a shared responsibility payment. 
This does, however, raise an important question about whether the 
challenged payment can be properly characterized as a “tax” that can 
be justified under the broad taxing power or must be treated as a 
“regulatory penalty” used to enforce a mandate that must be justified 
within the narrower commerce power. 
This tax–penalty distinction was also implicated by another 
claim asserted by the federal government early in the litigation—that 
the legal challenge to the mandate was premature under the Anti-
Injunction Act (“AIA”).
202
 The AIA provides that “no suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be 
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is 
 
 200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 201. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (majority opinion). 
 202. Id. at 2584. 
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the person against whom such tax was assessed.”
203
 Effectively, this 
means that individuals must pay their taxes before they can bring a 
suit to challenge them.
204
 The earliest that a taxpayer who fails to get 
insurance will have to pay the shared responsibility payment is 2015; 
if the AIA had applied, it would have prevented a challenge to the 
mandate until that time.
205
 
By the time litigation reached the Supreme Court, the federal 
government had abandoned this AIA claim, likely because it needed 
the matter resolved in order to encourage more states to begin reform 
implementation in time for the 2013 due date for exchanges to be up 
and running. Nonetheless, because this was a threshold issue that 
determined whether it was even appropriate for the Court to hear the 
substantive challenges, the Court appointed an amicus to argue that 
the action was barred by the AIA.
206
 
To better understand the basis for competing characterizations of 
the shared responsibility payment as a tax or penalty, it is important 
to understand a bit more about the legal and political context in 
which this question arises. First, despite the overwhelming focus on 
the mandate, the fact is that the ACA actually gives people a choice 
between purchasing a qualified health plan and making a shared 
responsibility payment.
207
 Second, for those who are subject to the 
mandate and fail to buy insurance, they must make the required 
payment to the IRS as part of their tax filing; and like taxes, the 
amount due is determined, in part, as a percentage of income.
208
 If 
one fails to make the payment, it can be withheld by the IRS from a 
refund otherwise due to the taxpayer.
209
 
 
 203. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (effective December 21, 2000). 
 204. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (explaining that the purpose of this 
provision is to “protect[] the Government’s ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue, by 
barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes”). 
 205. Id. at 2580. 
 206. The Court appointed Robert A. Long to brief and argue the proposition that the AIA bars 
the current challenges to the individual mandate. Id. at 2582 n.2. Plaintiffs and the federal 
government argued against this interpretation. Reply Brief for Private Respondents on the Anti-
Injunction Act at 1–3, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-
398), 2012 WL 605833, at *1–3; see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2583–84 (holding 
that the government is correct in contending that the AIA does not bar the suit). 
 207. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010). 
 208. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 209. Id. 
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On the other hand, the ACA labels the payment a “penalty” that 
is treated like taxes.
210
 Moreover, the President and lawmakers have 
consistently referred to the shared responsibility payment as a 
“penalty” that would be used to enforce the mandate to buy 
insurance, not as a “tax” on one’s choice to buy insurance.
211
 Indeed, 
the government has made clear that a mandate is essential to the 
success of health reform since buying insurance is crucial for solving 
the cost shifting and other financial consequences of the uninsured; 
the shared responsibility payment is an alternative, but not a 
desirable one.
212
 Finally, no lower court had held that the payment 
could be conceived of as a tax for purposes of the constitutional 
analysis, and only one had held that it functioned like a tax for 
purposes of the AIA bar.
213
 
 
 210. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (majority opinion) (“[The] penalty for not 
complying with the mandate ‘shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable 
penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68,’” which, “in turn ‘shall be assessed and collected in the 
same manner as taxes.’”); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(g)(1) (2010). 
 211. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty 
.pdf; see also Interview by George Stephanopoulos with President Barack Obama (ABC 
television broadcast Sept. 20, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/ 
2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax/ (rejecting characterizations of the mandate as a tax and 
repeatedly describing the shared responsibility payment as a means to ensure more people take 
responsibility for purchasing health insurance). 
 212. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that 
the whole point of the shared responsibility payment is to incentivize the purchase of health 
insurance). 
 213. See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 5–10 (D.C. Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (applying a functional analysis to reject the “tax” label for 
purposes of the AIA bar and only considering the constitutionality of the mandate under the 
commerce power); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539–40, 549 (6th Cir. 2011), 
abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (rejecting the “tax” label for purposes of 
the AIA bar and noting that there is no reason to consider the taxing power justification for the 
mandate because it is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power). In concurring opinions, 
Judges Sutton and Graham specifically considered and rejected the taxing power theory as 
justification for the mandate. Thomas More Law Ctr., at 550–54, 566. The Fourth Circuit was the 
only court to hold that the Anti-Injunction Act, which “[b]y its terms . . . bars suits seeking to 
restrain the assessment or collection of a tax,” barred a challenge to the mandate. Liberty Univ., 
Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 
S. Ct. 2566; see id. at 397–401 (vacating the judgment of the district court because it lacked 
jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of the act). Consequently the court did not reach the 
merits of the constitutional analysis. Despite this holding, however, the court left unanswered the 
question of whether the assessment could still be considered a “penalty” for purposes of the 
constitutional analysis. Id. at 413 (“Plaintiffs’ remaining contention as to why the AIA does not 
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Thus, in order to answer the legal questions before it, the 
Supreme Court had to decide whether the payment was a tax or a 
penalty, and the Court surprised most people by deciding that it was 
both. 
1.  Why the Anti-Injunction Act Does Not Apply: 
The Payment as a Penalty 
On the only issue about which all nine Justices could agree, the 
Supreme Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the 
plaintiffs’ challenge, concluding that the shared responsibility 
payment could not be viewed as a tax for purposes of applying the 
bar.
214
 Although this result was not surprising, the Court’s reasoning 
did not follow the trend of the lower courts. 
The lower courts considering the issue seem to have assumed 
that the analysis of whether the payment should be considered a tax 
or a penalty would be the same for both the AIA and constitutional 
questions.
215
 While the specific label given to the payment by 
Congress was important, the lower courts applied a functional test to 
look beyond the label to determine whether the payment actually 
 
bar their challenge to the individual mandate is that it imposes an unconstitutional regulatory 
penalty ‘not designed to raise revenue,’ which assertedly violates the Commerce Clause [and] the 
Taxing and Spending Clause . . . . The problem with this argument is that a claim that an exaction 
is an unconstitutional regulatory penalty does not insulate a challenge to it from the AIA bar.”); 
see also id. at 423 (Davis, J., dissenting) (“Before today, nine federal judges had expressly 
considered the application of the Anti-Injunction Act, and all nine held it inapplicable to the 
Affordable Care Act’s mandates.”). 
 214. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2584 (majority opinion); id. at 2655–56 2645 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 215. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“A fundamental issue overlaps the defendants' challenges 
to several of the plaintiffs' claims, and that is whether the individual mandate penalty is a ’tax’ 
within Congress’s broad taxing power and thus subject to the Anti-Injunction Act, or instead, a 
‘penalty’ that must be authorized, if at all, by Congress’s narrower Commerce Clause power. 
Because of the importance of this issue, I will analyze it first and at some length.”). The district 
court went on to hold that the payment was not a tax for the AIA or for the constitutional analysis. 
Id. at 1136–44. A number of courts did not have to address the taxing power issue after finding 
that the AIA did not bar the claim because they found the mandate was constitutional under the 
commerce power. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 549. Nonetheless, in concurring 
opinions, Judge Sutton and Graham agreed that the challenge was not barred by the AIA, and 
would have gone further to hold that the mandate could not be justified as an exercise of the 
taxing power. Id. at 550–54, 566. Although the Fourth Circuit in Liberty applied a functional 
analysis to the tax-penalty question, it left open the possibility that the payment could be treated 
like a tax for the purposes of the AIA but a penalty under the constitutional analysis. Liberty 
Univ., 671 F.3d at 413. But not all of the judges agreed. In a concurring opinion, Judge Wynn 
insisted that his “conclusion that the mandates are (constitutional) taxes inevitably leads back to 
the AIA’s bar to this case.” Id. at 415 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
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functioned more like a tax or a penalty, and all but one concluded 
that the payment was more accurately considered a penalty than a 
tax.
216
 The amicus appointed to argue the AIA claim before the 
Supreme Court similarly relied on a functional test but used it to 
argue for the opposite result—that the payment looked more like a 
tax, and thus should be subject to the AIA bar.
217
 The Supreme Court 
rejected the functional test used by the courts and the amicus: 
Amicus argues that even though Congress did not label 
the shared responsibility payment a tax, we should treat it as 
such under the Anti-Injunction Act because it functions like 
a tax. It is true that Congress cannot change whether an 
exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes 
simply by describing it as one or the other. Congress may 
not, for example, expand its power under the Taxing 
Clause, or escape the Double Jeopardy Clause’s constraint 
on criminal sanctions, by labeling a severe financial 
punishment a “tax.” 
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, 
however, are creatures of Congress’s own creation. How 
they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best 
evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text. We have 
thus applied the Anti-Injunction Act to statutorily described 
“taxes” even where that label was inaccurate.
218
 
Amicus offered additional arguments that did not rely on this tax 
characterization. For example, amicus argued that the AIA had been 
applied to other kinds of assessments and that by considering the 
 
 216. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., 671 F.3d at 404 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed 
that congressional labels have little bearing on whether an exaction qualifies as a ‘tax’ for 
statutory purposes. . . . In light of this history, it is not surprising that no federal appellate court, 
except the Sixth Circuit in Thomas More, has ever held that the label affixed to an exaction 
controls, or is even relevant to, the applicability of the AIA.”); Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d 
at 539–40; see also Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (“It is not surprising to us that all of the federal courts, which have otherwise reached 
sharply divergent conclusions on the constitutionality of the individual mandate, have spoken on 
this issue with clarion uniformity. Beginning with the district court in this case, all have found, 
without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory penalty, not a tax.”). 
 217. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2583. 
 218. Id. (citations omitted); accord id. at 2656 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (“What qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, unlike what 
qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Constitution, is entirely within the control of Congress”). 
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Anti-Injunction Act and Affordable Care Act together, Congress’s 
intent to make the Anti-Injunction Act applicable to the individual 
mandate became clear.
219
 The Court did not find these arguments 
convincing,
220
 emphasizing the importance of the penalty label as 
evidence of Congress’s intent.
221
 The Court found the AIA 
inapplicable.
222
 
2.  The Constitutional Analysis: 
Reconceptualizing the Payment as a “Tax” 
In contrast to the AIA analysis, the Supreme Court did not defer 
to Congress’s label for the purpose of determining whether the 
payment could be characterized as a “tax” that could be used to 
uphold the mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing 
power.
223
 The Court said that it must look beyond the label and apply 
a functional test to determine whether the payment effectively 
functioned more like a tax subject to the taxing power or a penalty 
subject to the Commerce Clause.
224
 This time, Chief Justice Roberts, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, found 
that the shared responsibility payment could be characterized as a tax 
and upheld the mandate under the taxing power. 
 
 219. See id. at 2583. 
 220. Essentially, amicus argued that by directing that the penalty be “assessed and collected 
in the same manner as taxes,’” Congress intended to have the penalty treated as a “tax” for 
purposes of the AIA bar as well. Id. at 2583. The federal government contested this interpretation, 
arguing that this provision was meant only as a directive to the “Secretary of the Treasury to use 
the same ‘methodology and procedures’” for collection of taxes. Id. The Court found the federal 
government’s argument more persuasive. Id. at 2583–84. Amicus also pointed to another 
provision of the Internal Revenue code—§ 6201(a)—which “authorizes the Secretary to make 
‘assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and 
assessable penalties).’” Id. at 2584. It argued that this was evidence that penalties should be 
treated like taxes, including for purposes of the AIA bar, but the Court rejected this argument as 
well. Id. The Court noted that although this interpretation seems reasonable when reading the 
statute in isolation, it is clear from a more comprehensive reading of the Internal Revenue Code 
as a whole that taxes and penalties are treated as distinct terms and have different legal 
consequences in other instances. Id. Thus, the Court found that one provision merely authorizing 
the Secretary to assess penalties as part of its tax assessment “does not equate assessable penalties 
to taxes for other purposes.” Id. 
 221. Id. at 2583 (citation omitted). 
 222. Id. at 2584; id. at 2656 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original). 
 223. Id. at 2594 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“It is up to Congress whether to apply the Anti-
Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Congress’s choice of 
label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within 
Congress’s constitutional power to tax.”). 
 224. Id. at 2594–95. 
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It was clear that this was not an easy decision for the Chief 
Justice to make. Writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts began this 
part of the opinion by noting that the government’s taxing-power 
argument presented a serious conceptual challenge to the Court: 
The Government’s tax power argument asks us to view 
the statute differently than we did in considering its 
commerce power theory. In making its Commerce Clause 
argument, the Government defended the mandate as a 
regulation requiring individuals to purchase health 
insurance. The Government does not claim that the taxing 
power allows Congress to issue such a command. Instead, 
the Government asks us to read the mandate not as ordering 
individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on 
those who do not buy that product.
225
 
The government’s use of terms like “coverage requirement” and 
“mandate” makes the law look regulatory in nature and appears to 
create a legal obligation to do something—purchase insurance—that 
must be authorized by the Commerce Clause. Indeed, this was the 
assumption that pervaded the federal government’s rhetoric and 
primary legal justification both in the ACA and in its briefs and 
arguments before the Court.
226
 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts almost 
immediately conceded that this was “the most straightforward 
reading of the mandate.”
227
 But he also acknowledged that statutes 
can have different meanings and said that as long as the 
government’s alternative reading of the statute was a reasonable one, 
 
 225. Id. at 2593 (citation omitted). 
 226. See, e.g., id. at 2584–91. 
 227. Id. at 2573–74. Justice Ginsburg, writing for Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
concurred with most of the Chief Justice’s rationale for upholding the mandate under the taxing 
power. Id. at 2576. But Justice Ginsburg did not join the part of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
where he concluded that “the most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands 
individuals to purchase insurance,” and that because the Commerce Clause does not support the 
individual mandate, it is necessary to turn to the taxing power as an alternative justification. Id. In 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, she wrote separately to make clear that she disagreed with the 
Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters on the commerce issue and that she did not think it was 
necessary to even address the commerce issue in light of the fact that a majority agreed that the 
coverage requirement, Id. at 2628-29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). She did not express an opinion about what she considered to be 
the most natural reading of the mandate or the apparent inconsistency between the taxing-power 
and commerce-power justifications raised by the Joint Dissenters. 
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the Court had a “plain duty. . . to adopt [this reading if it] will save 
the Act.”
228
 
The Chief Justice then considered the reasonableness of the 
government’s tax characterization under the functional analysis. This 
time, writing for a majority, he asked whether the shared 
responsibility payment looked more like a tax, which could be 
upheld under the extremely broad taxing power, or whether it must 
be viewed as a regulatory penalty for a mandate, which five Justices 
had already decided would violate the commerce power.
229
 The 
Court concluded that the payment could be viewed as functioning 
like a tax in many respects: 
[I]t is paid into the Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file 
their tax returns. It does not apply to individuals who do not 
pay federal income taxes because their household income is 
less than the filing threshold in the Internal Revenue Code. 
For taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is 
determined by such familiar factors as taxable income, 
number of dependents, and joint filing status. [Moreover,] 
[t]he requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue 
Code and enforced by the IRS, which—as we previously 
explained—must assess and collect it “in the same manner 
as taxes.” [Finally,] [t]his process yields the essential 
feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for the 
Government. Indeed, the payment is expected to raise about 
$4 billion per year by 2017.
230
 
Moreover, the Court found that the assessment does not have the 
usual indices of a penalty for unlawful conduct. In distinguishing the 
ACA payment from the kind of penalty typically subject to the 
stricter Commerce Clause test, the Court looked at three things: the 
amount due, the absence of a scienter requirement, and the means of 
collection.
231
 First, the Court noted that for most Americans the 
amount due will be far less than the price of insurance, which gives 
consumers a real choice between making the payment to the 
government or buying insurance; thus the payment does not look like 
 
 228. Id. at 2593–94 (“The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the 
mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”). 
 229. Id. at 2593. 
 230. Id. at 2594 (citations omitted). 
 231. Id. at 2595–96. 
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a “‘prohibitory’ financial punishment” that is designed to force 
compliance with the mandate.
232
 This was supported by CBO 
estimates that four million people each year will choose to pay the 
IRS rather than buy insurance.
233
 
Second, the coverage requirement is solely enforced through 
IRS collection of the shared responsibility payment, and the ACA 
prohibits the IRS from using its harshest collection tools, such as 
liens, levies, and criminal prosecution, which are more consistent 
with punitive sanctions.
234
 Finally, the fact that there is no scienter 
requirement, coupled with the government’s affirmation that people 
can comply with the law either by purchasing insurance or paying 
the tax, suggests that the government is not trying to penalize 
wrongful behavior but rather is using a tax to merely encourage 
people to purchase insurance.
235
 The majority highlighted the fact 
that people are in compliance with the law if they choose to pay the 
tax, which undermines the challengers’ (and dissent’s) 
characterization of the failure to purchase insurance as unlawful. 
Although the majority acknowledged that the payment is designed to 
encourage the purchase of insurance and thus serves a “regulatory 
function,” precedent has made clear that many taxes serve a dual 
regulatory and revenue raising purpose.
236
 
The Joint Dissenters issued a scathing dissent, criticizing the 
majority’s assumption that the payment could be legitimately 
conceived of as a penalty and tax at the same time for purposes of 
applying two different constitutional standards.
237
 They accused the 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 2597. 
 234. Id. at 2596; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(g)(2) (2010) (barring criminal prosecutions 
and prohibiting the Secretary of Health and Human Services from using notices of lien and 
levies). 
 235. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 236. Id. As the Court noted: 
‘[E]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic 
impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.’ That § 5000A 
seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that it 
cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing power. 
Id. at 2596 (citation omitted). 
 237. Id. at 2650–51 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). The dissent did admit that the payment can be “both [a tax and penalty] for 
statutory purposes since Congress can define ‘tax’ and ‘penalty’ in its enactments any way it 
wishes.” Id. at 2651 n.5. 
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majority of ignoring precedent that established “a clear line between 
a tax and a penalty: ‘[A] tax is an enforced contribution to provide 
for the support of government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed 
by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.’”
238
 They also argued 
that the threshold question of whether the provision is a tax or 
penalty should have turned on the Government’s framing, and it was 
clear that the Act adopted a framing of “wrongdoing” through its use 
of terms like “shall,” “requirement,” and “penalty.”
239
 Finally, the 
dissent pointed to the harms created by the majority’s holding, 
saying that the majority was rewriting the statute in a way that allows 
Congress to avoid political backlash from raising taxes, while also 
shielding it from the constitutional implications of creating a 
mandate that violates the commerce power.
240
 
In light of its holding, the Court then had to consider whether 
the “tax” violated a constitutional limit on direct taxes. The 
Constitution provides that “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall 
be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein 
before directed to be taken.”
241
 This requirement means that any 
“direct tax” must be apportioned so that each State pays in 
proportion to its population.
242
 The Court explained that this is an 
unclear clause with a very narrow application.
243
 It then briefly 
concluded that a tax on not having insurance “does not fall within 
any recognized category of direct tax” because it is not a 
capitation
244
 or a tax on the ownership of land or personal 
property.
245
 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded this part of the opinion by 
considering a more fundamental objection to upholding the mandate 
in light of the federalism-based concerns that animated the 
Commerce Clause opinions by the Chief Justice and the Joint 
 
 238. Id. at 2651 (citing United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 
213, 224 (1996)). 
 239. Id. at 2651–52. 
 240. Id. at 2653–55. 
 241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 242. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion). 
 243. Id. For a more thorough explanation of the history of the Direct Tax Clause and why it is 
an “anachronistic doctrine” with “ugly historical roots” that should not be applied to the mandate, 
see Amar, supra note 160, at 14–15. 
 244. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599 (“Capitations are taxes paid by every 
person, ‘without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.’”). 
 245. Id. 
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Dissenters. First, the Chief Justice explained that the activity 
requirement, which five Justices found to be a limit on the commerce 
power, has never been relevant to the taxing power: “[I]t is 
abundantly clear the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals 
may avoid taxation through inactivity.”
246
 Second, he emphasized the 
fact that the taxing power is subject to its own limits, like the Article 
I prohibition on direct taxes, although the Court found this 
prohibition was not implicated in this case.
247
 Finally, the Chief 
Justice noted that the taxing power should not trigger the same 
degree of concern about limiting federal power because “although 
the breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its power to 
regulate commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the 
same degree of control over individual behavior.”
248
 The power to 
regulate under the commerce power can be enforced with the most 
severe criminal sanctions, including huge fines, imprisonment, and 
all of the other social and civil losses or harm that can result from 
being branded a criminal.
249
 Paying a tax, while it can be 
burdensome, is not punishment; and in this instance, the ACA leaves 
individuals with a lawful choice to avoid the tax by getting 
insurance. 
V.  NFIB’S UNPRECEDENTED FINDING OF COERCION: 
ALLOWING STATES TO OPT OUT OF THE MEDICAID EXPANSION 
While Supreme Court review of the challenge to the mandate 
was seen as inevitable, the Court’s decision to grant certiorari on the 
challenge to the Medicaid expansion was unexpected. As described 
in Part II, Medicaid is a longstanding federal–state cooperative health 
program for the poor. Congress enacted the program pursuant to its 
spending power and has expressly reserved the right to make changes 
to the program,
250
 which it has done many times in order to expand 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 2599–2600. 
 248. Id. at 2600. 
 249. Id. This includes the “deprivation of otherwise protected civil rights, such as the right to 
bear arms or vote in elections; loss of employment opportunities; social stigma; and severe 
disabilities in other controversies, such as custody or immigration disputes.” Id. 
 250. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 of the Social Security Act provides that “[t]he right to alter, amend, or 
repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006). 
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the eligibility criteria. In contrast to the novel and unprecedented 
mandate challenge, courts have routinely held that amendments to 
the Medicaid program are constitutional under Congress’s spending 
power.
251
 By granting certiorari on this question, the Court signaled 
its willingness to consider more robust limits on Congress’s spending 
power. 
A.  The Spending Power 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives 
Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general 
Welfare of the United States.”
252
 The Court has interpreted this 
power very broadly to allow the federal government to use federal 
funds as an incentive to states to adopt a federal regulatory regime. 
In other words, the federal government can use spending conditions 
to encourage a state to take actions that it could not directly require 
them to take.
253
 
The plaintiffs in this case were not challenging the federal 
government’s power to attach conditions to Medicaid funding 
generally. Rather the plaintiffs were challenging how the government 
structured this particular expansion. Pursuant to Congress’s right to 
amend Medicaid program conditions, the ACA enacted this 
expansion as an amendment to the existing Medicaid program. This 
meant that Congress made states’ continuing participation in 
Medicaid—and thus the receipt of funding for beneficiaries eligible 
under pre-ACA criteria—conditional upon states’ participation in the 
expansion.
254
 This is significant, states argued, because a provision 
of the Medicaid Act predating the ACA gives HHS the power to 
terminate the funding of states that do not comply with Medicaid 
program requirements.
255
 As a result, states that refuse to participate 
in the expansion could lose all Medicaid funding. 
It is important to note that terminating all Medicaid funds was 
the most extreme option under this provision; the Secretary had the 
 
 251. See Leonard, supra note at 68, at 788 n.47. 
 252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1. 
 253. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601–02 (citation omitted). 
 254. Id. at 2601. 
 255. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (providing that if a state’s Medicaid plan does not comply with the 
Act’s requirements, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may declare that “further 
payments will not be made to the State”). But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(invalidating application of this provision to states that refuse to participate in the expansion). 
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discretion to take less drastic steps, such as terminating payments 
only for the categories of service directly affected by the 
noncompliance while continuing to allow payments for areas 
unaffected by this failure.
256
 In fact, the federal government has 
never terminated all of a state’s funding due to noncompliance, and 
there was no evidence that the federal government intended to do so 
when the suit was brought.
257
 State plaintiffs alleged that merely 
structuring the expansion this way created a “threat [that] serves no 
purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up for the 
dramatic expansion in healthcare coverage effected by the Act” and 
thus was coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
258
 
1.  The Dole Test Before NFIB 
Challenges to the spending power require the courts to balance 
the right of the federal government to attach conditions to ensure the 
appropriate use of its funds with fears that this power could be used 
to usurp state authority. To this end, the Supreme Court in South 
Dakota v. Dole
259
 established a four-prong test for determining the 
constitutionality of Spending Clause legislation: 
First, the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit 
of the general welfare. Second, the conditions on the receipt 
of federal funds must be reasonably related to the 
legislation’s stated goal. Third, Congress’s intent to 
condition funds on a particular action must be unambiguous 
and must enable the states to knowingly exercise their 
choice whether to participate. Finally, the federal legislation 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Doing so would only undermine the federal government’s own goals for expanding 
coverage for the most vulnerable among us, and it would be a dramatic departure from its typical 
flexibility and willingness to issue states waivers. Moreover, the claim was filed minutes after the 
legislation was signed so there was no time for such a threat. 
 258. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 259. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which 
directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold 5 percent of the federal highway funds 
otherwise payable to a state if that state permitted the purchase of alcoholic beverages by 
individuals under twenty-one years of age). 
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cannot “induce the States to engage in activities that would 
themselves be unconstitutional.”
260
 
This Dole test has long been understood to be very easy to 
satisfy. Indeed, the NFIB plaintiffs did not initially challenge any of 
these requirements.
261
 In reviewing the challenge below, both the 
Florida district court and the Eleventh Circuit found the test easily 
satisfied.
262
 It was beyond dispute that spending to improve 
healthcare for those most in need furthers the general welfare. 
Second, conditioning all Medicaid funds on the expansion was seen 
as “undeniably related to the purpose of the Medicaid Act, which is 
to ‘provid[e] federal financial assistance to States that choose to 
reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.’”
263
 
Third, Congress expressly reserved its right “to alter [or] amend” the 
program conditions in the future, which satisfied the “unambiguous 
or knowing choice” requirement.
264
 Finally, there was no claim that 
the expansion was otherwise unconstitutional.
265
 
Both the district court and Eleventh Circuit made clear that the 
focus of the plaintiffs’ claim was on an additional limit on the use of 
the spending power also articulated in Dole—the anticoercion 
principle.
266
 This anticoercion limit was derived in part from the 
Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states, 
which was understood to prohibit Congress from employing its 
 
 260. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1263 
(11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (citing to South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 261. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1266 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (citations omitted) (“Preliminarily, I note that in their complaint the state 
plaintiffs appear to have relied solely on a ‘coercion and commandeering’ theory. Nowhere in that 
pleading do they allege or intimate that the Act also violates the four ‘general restrictions’ in 
Dole, nor did they make the argument in opposition to the defendants’ previous motion to 
dismiss. . . . Apparently expanding that argument, the state plaintiffs now argue (very briefly, in 
less than one full page) that the Act’s Medicaid provisions violate the four general restrictions. 
This belated argument is unpersuasive. . . . [T]he only real issue with respect to Count IV . . . is 
whether the Medicaid provisions are impermissibly coercive and effectively commandeer the 
states.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 262. See id. at 1263–69. 
 263. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1263 n.63 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 301 (1980)). 
 264. See id. at 1267. 
 265. See id. at 1263. 
 266. Id. The doctrine was first developed in 1937 in Steward and has been affirmed 
repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937). 
  
606 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:541 
 
spending power “in such a way as to ‘coerce’ the states into 
compliance with the federal objective.”
267
 The clearest application of 
this anticoercion principle occurs where legislation explicitly 
mandates some action by states or state officials. For example, the 
Court has invalidated legislation compelling state law enforcement 
officers to perform federally mandated background checks on 
handgun purchasers
268
 and legislation compelling a state to either 
take title to nuclear waste or enact particular state waste 
regulations.
269
 
The anticoercion principle in the spending context is much more 
challenging and amorphous because spending conditions are 
structured to preserve state choice. But the Court in Dole said that 
“in some circumstances the financial inducement . . . [may be] so 
coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”
270
 This idea that the amount of inducement could 
become so large as to be coercive has been reaffirmed in other cases, 
but prior to NFIB the Court had never invalidated Spending Clause 
legislation on this basis.
271
 Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit 
explained in its decision below, most federal courts have found the 
anticoercion principle at best incoherent and at worst completely 
unworkable.
272
 The Court has been criticized for not providing any 
guidance for distinguishing coercion from mere temptation or an 
offer that is too good to refuse.
273
 The doctrine itself has been 
criticized as creating the perverse result that the more generous the 
federal government is with its funding, the greater the chance the 
amount could be seen as coercive and the less control the federal 
government may have over its own funds.
274
 
 
 267. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1264. 
 268. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, 
C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (citing Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997)). 
 269. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–75 (1992). 
 270. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590). 
 271. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 272. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1265 (“[F]ederal courts have been similarly 
reluctant to use it.”). 
 273. See, e.g., Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting 
Through the Dole Loophole, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163 (2001); see Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 
102. 
 274. See Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 104. 
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2.  After NFIB: A New Theory of 
Coercion or the Dole Test with Teeth? 
For the first time, the Court in NFIB found a federal spending 
condition to be coercive. The Court’s decision was surprising not 
only because it was unprecedented, but also because it was the only 
substantive aspect of the case that did not result in the usual 5–4 
divide. Seven Justices, through two separate opinions, agreed that 
requiring participation in the expansion as a condition of existing 
Medicaid funding was coercive.
275
 The notion that states must have 
had a “genuine” or “real choice” in deciding whether to participate in 
the expansion was key to this holding.
276
 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for himself, Justice Breyer, and 
Justice Kagan, began by discussing the tension between the federal 
government’s right to direct the use of its funds for the general 
welfare and the importance that this power does not undermine 
states’ choice about whether or not to participate as partners in 
implementing federal policy objectives.
277
 He compared this kind of 
federal–state partnership to a contract, emphasizing the importance 
of states “knowingly and voluntarily accept[ing] the terms of the 
‘contract.’”
278
 He also emphasized the importance of “scrutiniz[ing] 
Spending Clause legislation [in order] to ensure that Congress is not 
using financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to undue 
influence.’”
279
 The Joint Dissenters mirrored this approach in their 
separate opinion.
280
 In finding the expansion coercive, all seven 
 
 275. Justices Breyer and Kegan joined in Chief Justice Robert’s opinion, while Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito reached the same conclusion in their joint dissent. See id. at 
2601–09 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id at 2656–68 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). See also Varat, supra note 181, at 418. (“In fact, on 
this point the dissenters, despite withholding their official concurrence, were explicit in noting 
that ‘[s]even Members of the Court agree that the Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is 
unconstitutional.” (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)). 
 276. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by 
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 277. Id. at 2603. 
 278. Id. at 2602. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 2659-2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (describing federal 
funding conditions in a federal-state program as contractual in nature and noting that “just as a 
contract is voidable if coerced, ‘[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the 
spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
‘contract’”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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justices considered both the nature of the threat as well as the amount 
of financial inducement at stake.
281
 
a.  Nature of the inducement 
For Chief Justice Roberts, the nature of the inducement used by 
the federal government for the Medicaid expansion was problematic 
because when funding conditions “take the form of threats to 
terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are 
properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy 
changes”
282
 rather than as mere encouragement. Critical to this 
analysis was Chief Justice Roberts’s view of the expansion, not as an 
extension of the existing Medicaid program, but rather as a “new 
health care program” and thus different one.
283
 The Chief Justice and 
the Joint Dissenters seemed to agree that despite the fact that the 
federal government expressly reserved the right to amend the 
program, states could not have anticipated this kind of program 
change: 
The Medicaid expansion . . . accomplishes a shift in kind, 
not merely degree. The original program was designed to 
cover medical services for four particular categories of the 
needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy 
families with dependent children. Previous amendments to 
Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded the 
boundaries of these categories. Under the [ACA], 
Medicaid . . . is no longer a program to care for the 
neediest among us, but rather an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health 
insurance coverage. 
. . . . 
. . . A State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s 
reservation of the right to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid 
 
 281. Id. at 2602–07. 
 282. Id. at 2604 (emphasis added). 
 283. Id. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2657 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ. dissenting) (describing the expansion as “dramatic” and referring 
to Medicaid eligibility categories that existed prior to the ACA as “the old Medicaid program”). 
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program included the power to transform it so 
dramatically.
284
 
Chief Justice Roberts did not explain his determination that under the 
ACA Medicaid would no longer be a program for the neediest 
among us, which is striking in light of the fact that the expansion still 
would have targeted the extremely poor who are unlikely to be able 
to get insurance through employment or on the individual market. 
Rather, he seemed to rely on anachronistic assumptions about who 
qualifies as “in need.”
285
 
For Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters, the extremely 
generous federal funding for the expansion did not undermine states’ 
coercion argument. In fact, Roberts saw it as further evidence that 
the expansion was in fact a new and separate program, which, in 
turn, reinforced the coercive nature of the threat.
286
 This 
characterization of the expansion as a “new” program is important 
because it makes the relationship between new and existing program 
funds more tenuous and thus makes a threat to withhold one for the 
other look like coercion. This characterization also supports states’ 
claims that they could not have anticipated it as part of the original 
Medicaid conditions, further undermining the notion that they had a 
real choice to accept this possibility when they joined Medicaid. 
 
 284. Id. at 2605–06 (emphasis added); accord id. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, 
JJ. dissenting) (noting that “the offer that the ACA makes to the States–go along with a dramatic 
expansion of Medicaid or potentially lose all federal Medicaid funding–is quite unlike anything 
that we have seen in a prior spending-power case). 
 285. Such assumptions have been used to explain the original line drawing in public 
entitlement programs like Medicaid, but have since been recognized as anathema to sound health 
policy. See, e.g, Rosenbaum, supra note 35; STREMIKIS ET AL., supra note 40. One recent article 
suggests that the Court’s characterization of the expansion as a new program may be based on its 
mistaken belief about prior amendments and their connection to existing funding: “The NFIB 
plurality fundamentally misunderstood [Medicaid’s] history, leading it to overemphasize 
discontinuities between the existing Medicaid program and the Medicaid expansion.” Nicole 
Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases 15 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper 
No. 12-40, 2012). 
 286. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer 
& Kagan, JJ.) (“Indeed, the manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that while 
Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it recognized it 
was enlisting the States in a new health care program. Congress created a separate funding 
provision to cover the costs of providing services to any person made newly eligible by the 
expansion.”). 
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b.  Amount of the inducement 
The second part of the Court’s coercion inquiry focused more 
directly on the question of when the amount of financial inducement 
becomes coercive. Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters 
used Dole to distinguish mild encouragement from an inducement 
that is so significant that it deprives states of meaningful choice.
287
 In 
Dole the Court rejected a challenge to the National Minimum 
Drinking Age Act, which directed the Secretary of Transportation to 
withhold 5 percent of the federal highway funds otherwise payable to 
a state if that state permitted the purchase of alcoholic beverages by 
individuals under twenty-one years of age. The Court held that the 
amount could only be considered mild encouragement because the 
threat of loss was only 5 percent of highway funds, which constituted 
less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget at the time.
288
 
By contrast, the NFIB Court found that the threat of losing all 
Medicaid funds was so great as to have the effect of being “a gun to 
the head” of states that would force them to participate in the 
expansion.
289
 By one estimate, termination of all of a state’s 
Medicaid funds could amount to a loss of over 10 percent of the 
state’s overall budget.
290
 Moreover, the state would lose the 
extensive and costly administrative investments already made.
291
 
Finally, the Court noted the secondary effects of the funding loss, 
such as how it would impact states’ ability to receive funding for 
other services that are dependent on Medicaid participation. To the 
Court, this threat was enough to deprive states of any real choice in 
deciding whether to participate.
292
 
 
 287. Id. at 2604–05 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. 2662-2664 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ. dissenting). 
 288. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1986). 
 289. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604; accord id. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ. dissenting) (concluding that “the offer of the Medicaid Expansion was one 
that Congress understood no State could refuse”). 
 290. Id. (noting that the federal government has provided $3.3 trillion to states for the existing 
Medicaid program). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Unlike the majority, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor viewed the generous federal 
funding of the expansion as evidence that states were not being asked to undertake an onerous 
burden that the federal government would have to force them to take. Id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The Court rejected 
this argument, viewing the amount of new funding provided as irrelevant to the coercion analysis: 
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Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented from the holding, 
mainly criticizing the assumptions upon which the Court based its 
coercion holding. They disagreed with the characterization of the 
program as new and believed that states were on notice about the 
possibility of this kind of expansion in light of prior significant 
expansions.
293
 They also criticized the Court’s analysis for affirming 
an anticoercion principle that has proved unworkable and failed to 
give future litigants and judges meaningful guidance on how to 
determine whether a state has a “legitimate choice” to accept or 
decline federal funds with conditions attached.
294
 
The Court’s reasoning certainly raises more questions than it 
provides answers about how the anticoercion principle limits the 
typically broad Dole test. Although the Court purported to apply a 
coercion test, its reasoning about the nature of the threat was based 
on the Court’s finding that two of the Dole requirements were not 
met—the “reasonably related” and “knowing choice” requirements—
that were thought to have been easily satisfied by the lower courts, 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, and even the plaintiffs initially. 
B.  Severability in a Different Light 
The final question the Court had to consider was severability: if 
any provision was found unconstitutional, could that provision be 
severed from the ACA, leaving the rest of the Act intact, or would 
other parts of the Act have to fall as well? As noted in Part II, the 
overwhelming assumption by everyone, including the Supreme 
Court, was that this question would arise as a result of the mandate 
being struck down. Indeed, the severability question on which the 
Court granted certiorari was specifically tied to the mandate, and at 
oral arguments, very little time was given to this question in the 
Medicaid context. 
 
“[T]he size of the new financial burden imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the 
State has been coerced into accepting that burden. ‘Your money or your life’ is a coercive 
proposition, whether you have a single dollar in your pocket or $500.” Id. at 2605 n.12 (opinion 
of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); see also id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
& Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he ACA offer is not an ‘exceedingly generous’ gift that no State in 
its right mind would decline. Instead, acceptance of the offer will impose very substantial costs 
on participating States.”). 
 293. Id. at 2635–39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 294. Id. at 2639–41. 
  
612 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:541 
 
Despite the 7–2 coercion holding, severability was where the 
justices broke down along familiar lines again. Although Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor would have found the Medicaid expansion 
constitutional, they agreed with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Breyer and Kagan that this kind of constitutional infirmity could be 
remedied by simply prohibiting application of the coercive penalty 
provision to states that refuse to participate in the expansion, leaving 
the expansion in place as an option that states can choose.
295
 For the 
majority, this was a pretty clear-cut issue. The part of the Social 
Security Act that established Medicaid conditions and contained the 
penalty provision also contained a provision explicitly requiring any 
provision of the code held invalid to be severed from the rest of the 
provision of that Chapter.
296
 
The more difficult question to answer was “whether Congress 
would have wanted the rest of the Act to stand, had it known that 
States would have a genuine choice whether to participate in the new 
Medicaid expansion.”
297
 Unlike the Social Security Act, the ACA 
did not contain a severability provision. However, the majority relied 
on a longstanding judicial presumption in favor of severability in 
finding that “Congress would have wanted to preserve the rest of the 
Act.”
298
 Because the unconstitutional penalty provision could be 
severed from the part of the Act to which it most directly related—
the Medicaid expansion—it seemed only logical that it could be 
severed from the rest of the ACA, whose remaining provisions could 
“remain fully operative” and were independent of the Medicaid 
expansion.
299
 
 
 295. Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (noting that although they do not agree with the majority that conditioning the 
expansion on existing funds is unconstitutional, if it is, the proper remedy is to sever the penalty 
provision and leave the rest of the Medicaid expansion, and the entire ACA, intact). 
 296. Id. at 2607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (“The Chapter of 
the United States Code that contains § 1396c includes a severability clause confirming that we 
need go no further. That clause specifies that ‘[i]f any provision of this chapter, or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the 
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.’ [42 
U.S.C.] § 1303.”); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part). 
 297. Id.at 2607. 
 298. Id. at 2608. 
 299. Id. 
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The Joint Dissenters, on the other hand would have struck not 
only the Medicaid expansion itself as unconstitutional but the entire 
ACA.
300
 The dissent argued that the federal government relied on the 
Medicaid expansion as essential to its attempt at creating a near 
universal healthcare plan, which meant that it could not be severed 
from the rest of the law.
301
 The Joint Dissenters highlighted the 
gaping holes in coverage that would result from a state’s refusal to 
participate as evidence that the federal government viewed them as 
essentially linked. They concluded that the “most natural remedy” 
would be to invalidate the entire Medicaid expansion, which would 
mean that the rest of the law should be invalidated as well.
302
 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS OF NFIB 
As described in Part III, commentary around the health reform 
challenge focused the constitutional question and federalism debate 
around the mandate as an exercise of the commerce power. This 
narrative suggested a dichotomous choice: Would the conservative 
majority take this opportunity to further limit federal power, or could 
the liberal wing of the court sway one of the other justices to uphold 
the mandate? By upholding the mandate under the taxing power and 
making an unprecedented finding of coercion, the Court defied this 
simplistic narrative. NFIB generates interesting questions about 
constitutional limits on federal power, reform implementation, and 
the future of health policy, which will likely be explored by 
constitutional and health scholars for years to come. This Part 
suggests some possible implications that deserve attention. 
A.  Broader Constitutional Law Implications 
NFIB generated a range of reactions in the immediate aftermath. 
Some proponents of reform, especially those focused on the decision 
to uphold the mandate and the ACA as a whole, saw the decision as 
affirming the legitimate power of the federal government to address a 
healthcare crisis of national proportions. Some opponents, on the 
other hand, likely viewed NFIB as creating an unlimited, plenary 
power by the federal government that betrays our federalist structure 
 
 300. Id. at 2667–77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 301. Id. at 2669–76. 
 302. Id. at 2667-68. 
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and opens the door for further encroachments on state sovereignty 
and individual liberty. A closer look at the underlying reasoning for 
the mandate and Medicaid holdings, however, suggests that the 
implications for the scope of federal power in the future are far less 
clear. 
1.  From Commerce to Tax and Spend: 
A Shifting Battleground for Attacks on Federal Power? 
The activity–inactivity distinction creates a new express limit on 
the commerce power, but the significance of this limit is not clear. 
The government insisted that a health insurance mandate would not 
open the door to other kinds of mandates because of the uniqueness 
of the health insurance market. The inextricability of healthcare 
treatment and financing, the fact that laws entitle people to certain 
kinds of care regardless of their ability to pay, and the inevitability of 
needing healthcare created a unique and compelling problem, and the 
mandate was an essential part of solving this problem. The 
government relied on this uniqueness to assuage concerns that the 
mandate would or could usher in a new unlimited, plenary power for 
the federal government that it would use to control people’s lives. 
Moreover, there is no indication in the joint dissent that the 
activity requirement was intended to roll back earlier interpretations 
of the commerce power. Even as they found that the mandate 
exceeded the commerce power, both Chief Justice Roberts and the 
dissenting justices
303
 expressly affirmed earlier cases like Wickard 
and Raich, defining the power broadly.
304
 
The power to tax and spend was the sleeper issue and will likely 
generate the most attention going forward as the Court seemed to 
both expand and limit this federal power. In upholding the mandate 
and Medicaid expansion, the Court reaffirmed the expansive 
regulatory scope of the taxing and spending power. Indeed, these 
holdings may confirm fears that the power to tax and spend is a 
means of circumventing the more robust Tenth Amendment limits on 
 
 303. Only Justice Thomas, in a separate one-paragraph dissent, objected to the substantial 
effects test as inconsistent with the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2677 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 304. See, e.g, id. at 2588–91 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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other federal powers. These fears are likely exacerbated by the fact 
that the Court upheld a finding of the mandate as a tax based on 
reasoning perceived by many as less than satisfying or persuasive,
305
 
and after concluding that it could not be upheld under the commerce 
power—the site of more successful attempts to narrow federal 
power. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s reluctant and apologetic tone, 
as well as Justice Ginsburg’s neglect of the issue in her concurrence, 
suggests that not even a majority of the Court was fully persuaded by 
this justification. While a few legal scholars have offered more 
persuasive and robust justifications for this holding,
306
 this probably 
does little to assuage those who fear that the trajectory of the Roberts 
Court is toward greater deference to Congress and a reticence to 
narrow federal power. 
On the other hand, the Court seemed to apply a more robust 
Tenth Amendment limit on the spending power than it had in the 
past. The significance of this cannot be overemphasized; courts and 
legal scholars had all but given up on the idea that the anticoercion 
principle could be a meaningful limit on the spending power. Even 
scholars who argued for greater limits on the spending power 
conceded that the coercion doctrine as it existed was unworkable and 
thus the least effective way to accomplish this.
307
 They proposed 
alternatives, such as tightening up some of the Dole requirements, 
especially the “relatedness” and “unambiguous” or “knowing 
choice” requirements.
308
 And although the Court in NFIB purported 
to apply the “coercion” doctrine in limiting the Medicaid expansion, 
the Court in fact seemed to take these scholars up on their invitation 
to revisit the Dole test. NFIB’s coercion finding relied not simply on 
the amount of inducement—the factor presumed to determine 
coercion in prior Court dicta; it was also based on the conclusion that 
the federal government failed to satisfy the second and third Dole 
requirements, which had always been easily satisfied for Medicaid 
 
 305. See Dworkin, supra note 128. 
 306. See id.; see also supra note 160 (citing legal scholarship that argued that the taxing 
power provided a better justification for the mandate prior to NFIB). 
 307. See, e.g., Baker & Berman, supra note 117, at 517–21; Loyola, supra note 101, at 135–
42. 
 308. See e.g., Baker & Berman supra note 117, at 511–12. 
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amendments in the past.
309
 Scholars will likely be debating the 
contours of the spending power after NFIB for some time to come: 
does the Court’s reasoning reflect a new theory of coercion, an 
application of the Dole test with teeth, or both? 
2.  Chief Justice Roberts’s Legacy and the 
Role of Judicial Restraint 
Commentary leading up to NFIB implicitly and explicitly 
assumed the Supreme Court had immense power to determine the 
fate of health reform. It painted a picture of the Court as 
ideologically driven, and the media stoked predictions that Justices 
would decide the fate of healthcare reform based on their ideological 
positions rather than legal precedent.
310
 Some feared—and others 
hoped—that the five conservative Justices on the Court would use 
this opportunity to push a Republican agenda:
311
 
The Supreme Court may be headed for its most dramatic 
intervention in American politics—and most flagrant abuse 
of its power—since Bush v. Gore. 
The constitutional objections are silly. However, because 
constitutional law is abstract and technical and because 
almost no one reads Supreme Court opinions, the 
conservative majority on the Court may feel emboldened to 
 
 309. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601–06 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by 
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). For a more comprehensive consideration of the Medicaid coercion holding 
and its implications, refer to Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 285. 
 310. See, e.g., Michael Tomasky, My Supreme Court-Health Care Prediction, DAILY BEAST 
(June 27, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/27/my-supreme-court-health-
care-prediction.html (“This is easy. I take the darkest and most cynical possible view of the 
conservative majority; I believe . . . that they are politicians in robes (with the partial exception of 
Kennedy); as such, I believe they will behave here like politicians and they will render the 
decision that will inflict the maximum possible political damage on Obama and the Democrats.”). 
But not everyone was so cynical. See Meghan Kiesel, Obamacare Predictions: What Will the 
Supreme Court Decide? ABCNEWS (June 27, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
politics/2012/06/obamacare-predictions-what-will-the-supreme-court-decide/ (listing predictions 
from a variety of sources, many predicting that the mandate would be upheld, with some 
predicting a 6–3 decision). 
 311. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases and a New Dynamic, N.Y. 
TIMES Sept. 30, 2012, at A1; Akhil Amar, How to Defend Obamacare, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2012, 
4:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/03/supreme 
_court_and_obamacare_what_donald_verrilli_should_have_said_to_the_court_s_conservative_ju
stices_.html (explaining how the government’s counsel should have handled the conservative 
Justices); Winkler, supra note 151. 
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adopt these silly objections in order to crush the most 
important progressive legislation in decades.
312
 
These kinds of predictions caused some conservative opponents 
who were shocked by NFIB to blame Chief Justice Roberts for 
betraying conservative hopes,
313
 and it led to widespread speculation 
about his motives.
314
 This speculation was likely exacerbated by a 
scholarly debate that made it look like the commerce power test 
could come out either way, leaving the result apparently up for 
grabs.
315
 
Neglected in the commentary and dominant narrative was the 
concept of the Supreme Court as a federal actor that should show 
significant restraint when considering the constitutionality of 
legislation enacted by a democratically accountable body. This 
concept was not completely missing, however. In one speech, 
President Obama implored the Court to uphold the law not by 
making substantive legal arguments about its constitutionality, but by 
resorting to notions of judicial restraint.
316
 An even more pointed 
 
 312. Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1–2. 
 313. See, e.g., Katy Waldman, The Eight Stages of Conservative Greif, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 
6:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/06/republican_response 
_to_obamacare_decision_the_eight_stages_of_conservative_grief.html (quoting a tweet by 
Georgia Rep. Jack Kingston that read “With #Obamacare ruling, I feel like I just lost two great 
friends: America and Justice Roberts”); Elspeth Reeve, Time Is on His Side: Conservatives Feel 
Betrayed by John Roberts, ATLANTIC WIRE (June 28, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/ 
politics/2012/06/time-his-side-conservatives-feel-betrayed-john-roberts/54023/; Erick Erickson, 
The Supreme Court Forces Us to Deal Within the Political System, RED STATE BLOG (June 28, 
2012), http://www.redstate.com/erick/2012/06/28/the-supreme-court-forces-us-to-deal-within-the 
-political-system/ (“John Roberts’ opinion seems to clearly suggest he wants to keep the Supreme 
Court out of political fights and was willing to destroy his reputation with conservatives to do 
it.”). 
 314. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 311 (describing the coming term for the Supreme Court): 
“The term will also provide signals about the repercussions of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s 
surprise decision in June to join the court’s four more liberal members and supply the decisive 
fifth vote in the landmark decision to uphold President Obama’s health care law. Every decision 
of the new term will be scrutinized for signs of whether Chief Justice Roberts, who had been a 
reliable member of the court’s conservative wing, has moved toward the ideological center of the 
court.” Liptak also says that the term “could clarify whether the health care ruling will come to be 
seen as the case that helped Chief Justice Roberts protect the authority of his court against 
charges of partisanship . . . .” Id. 
 315. See Pushaw, supra note 112, at 882 (noting that justices are particularly vulnerable to 
such claims in cases involving the commerce power and criticizing the current test as so 
“malleable” and “vague” that it “can be applied, whether intentionally or not, to promote a 
particular ideological agenda”). 
 316. Obama Takes Aim at Supreme Court, Calls Them “Unelected Group of People”, FOX 
NATION (Apr. 2, 2012), http://nation.foxnews.com/president-obama/2012/04/02/obama-slams 
-activist-supreme-court-calls-them-unelected-group-people. Obama states, “Ultimately, I'm 
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admonition to the Court came from legal scholar Akhil Amar, in an 
editorial on Slate.com.
317
 Styled as an open letter to the Supreme 
Court, Amar’s editorial highlighted the troubling consequences for 
the Court’s own legitimacy if it were to strike down the mandate: 
Nothing in the Constitution or history or structure—or 
precedents, for that matter—provides suitable support for 
the “mandates are different” intuition, which cannot survive 
analytic scrutiny. Such an opinion will not write—or if it 
does, it will not last. 
. . . . 
Meaning, with the greatest of respect for an institution 
and individuals whom I hold dear, I have to teach the stuff 
that Your Honors write year in and year out to my students. 
And if a judicial opinion simply fails tests of text, history, 
structure, and logic—and if it comes down by a 5–4 vote; 
and if the vote seems to track the party-alignment of 
appointing presidents; and if the four dissenters are 
emphatic that the majority’s arguments simply don’t wash; 
and if the vast majority of us who study constitutional law 
professionally, including most conservative scholars, agree 
that these arguments simply don’t wash; and if I already 
have to do a lot of work to explain Bush v. Gore, in 
context—well, what will I tell my students when they say to 
me, cynically, that “it’s all politics”? What will I say, when 
they ask me (as I have already been asked by one former 
student): “Just how many presidential elections are five 
conservative justices allowed to undo?”
318
 
While I will refrain from speculating about the Chief Justice’s 
motives or whether he was swayed by Professor Amar’s letter,
319
 I 
 
confident that the Supreme Court will not take what would be an unprecedented extraordinary 
step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected 
congress. And I would like to remind conservative commentators that for years what we have 
heard is that the biggest problem is judicial activism and that an unelected group of people would 
somehow overturn a duly constituted and passed law.” Id. 
 317. Amar, supra note 311. Amar developed these arguments more fully in a later essay. See 
Amar, supra note 160. 
 318. Amar, supra note 311. 
 319. For speculation about which, if any, legal scholars influenced Chief Justice Roberts’s 
decision to uphold the mandate under the taxing power, refer to Randy Barnett, The 
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do think it is fair to say that Chief Justice Roberts was clearly 
mindful of limits on the Court’s own power and expressly relied 
upon judicial restraint at key junctures in the decision. The first was 
in his framing of the case at the very beginning: 
In this case we must again determine whether the 
Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but 
which many States and individuals believe it does not 
possess. Resolving this controversy requires us to examine 
both the limits of the Government’s power, and our own 
limited role in policing those boundaries.
320
 
This principle was critical to the Court’s decision to uphold the 
mandate, preserve the Medicaid expansion as an option, and save the 
rest of the law. Indeed, the joint dissent, which would have held the 
mandate and Medicaid expansion unconstitutional and invalidated 
the entire Act, is noteworthy for its apparent apathy toward the 
principle of judicial restraint. When considering the opinion in its 
entirety, it becomes clear that Chief Justice Roberts’s positions on 
the underlying substantive questions seem to align more with the 
conservative justices, and that their divide on the ultimate holdings 
seems driven by different perspectives on how much restraint the 
Court should show in light of federalism principles. 
B.  ACA Implementation and 
the Future of Health Policy 
NFIB could have a significant impact on reform implementation 
and the future of health policy. Upholding the ACA paves the way 
for implementation, which will likely change the rhetoric around 
health reform and increase public support by allowing people to see 
how reform empowers states and individuals to make meaningful 
choices. On the other hand, the coercion holding could have serious 
negative consequences. In the short term, it will undermine 
implementation of the Medicaid expansion in those states that opt 
 
Unprecedented Uniqueness of Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 5, 
2012, 5:14 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/05/the-unprecedented-uniqueness-of-chief-
justice-roberts-opinion/; Robert Cooter & Neil Siegel, Online ACA Symposium: A Theory of the 
Tax Power that Justifies—and May Have Informed—the Chief Justice’s Analysis, SCOTUSBLOG 
(July 9, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-aca-symposium-a 
-theory-of-the-tax-power-that-justifies-and-may-have-informed-the-chief-justices-analysis-2/. 
 320. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
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out. Over the long term, it could potentially serve as a barrier to the 
federal government’s ability to use program amendments to adapt 
longstanding federal-state programs, like Medicaid, to changing 
health realities. 
1.  Moving Beyond Rhetorical Federalism
321
 
Opponents of reform claimed the mantle of “protectors of 
federalism” in the legal debates on the mandate, while casting those 
who embraced reform as “nationalists” who look to the federal 
government to solve every problem and who devalue local 
governance.
322
 In this narrative, federal power is viewed as an 
inherent threat to states and individual liberty. By saving health 
reform, however, NFIB preserves the opportunity for people to 
understand how the ACA furthers state sovereignty and individual 
liberty. We can now move beyond vague assertions of threats to state 
sovereignty and individual liberty, and the benefits of cooperative 
and collective-action federalism can come to fruition. 
The rollout of the health benefit exchanges, in particular, creates 
an opportunity for states and communities to help shape reform 
going forward. As described earlier, the ACA continues the trend of 
vast state discretion and flexibility and requires stakeholder input as 
part of that process.
323
 Different states vary in the approaches they 
are taking to a wide range of implementation decisions that have 
been delegated to them: plan design, selection and regulation; the 
exchange’s role and regulatory philosophy; stakeholder participation; 
information dissemination and marketing; and consumer assistance 
 
 321. Some have defended states’ use of this kind of federalist rhetoric. See, e.g., Leonard, 
supra note 78 (“While it is easy to dismiss state resistance to ACA as nothing more than Tea 
Party politics, my counter view suggests several possible values deriving from the anti-health 
reform movement.”). Leonard defines “rhetorical federalism” as the “highly public and vocal 
invocation of states-rights arguments to frame objections to comprehensive, sea-changing federal 
policies.” Id. at 73. She says, “[t]he theory finds normative value in state-based resistance to 
sweeping federal initiatives although not all strategies employed are condoned.” Id. My critique 
in this section is focused more specifically on what Balkin has described as the use of federalism 
theory as a “rhetorical excuse” for nonregulation. See Balkin, supra note 115, at 40. 
 322. See supra Part III. 
 323. To track the various approaches that states are taking toward health reform 
implementation, see State Exchange Profiles, Health Reform Source, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., http://healthreform.kff.org/State-Exchange-Profiles-Page.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 
2013). 
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programs. These decisions serve as models for the federal 
government as it designs the federal exchange.
324
 In this way, the 
ACA explicitly values, encourages, and depends on the kind of state 
experimentation and local decision-making that opponents claim is 
threatened by federal action. 
This is not a prediction that reform will work—that is, that it 
will solve our healthcare problem by making insurance affordable 
and increasing access through coverage. Rather, I am making a more 
limited claim that the ACA creates a “platform of uniform standards 
on which both states and private parties can innovate,”
325
 standards 
which at least provide an opportunity to increase consumer choice in 
the healthcare market. If the market reforms are successful, then 
people will likely come to appreciate how the ACA enhances their 
freedom to get health insurance, and thus the healthcare they need to 
fully realize their liberty. If reform does not work—that is, if market 
reforms do not ultimately guarantee affordable coverage—then 
people will have no legal obligation to either buy insurance or make 
the shared responsibility payment, and liberty concerns will not be 
implicated. 
The ACA in action will challenge reform opponents to heed 
Balkin’s admonition to “take the language of experimentation 
seriously rather than as a rhetorical excuse for nonregulation, or as a 
way to resist the application of federal constitutional rights.”
326
 The 
merits of reform will continue to be up for debate among people who 
disagree on how much or how little regulation is needed to actually 
fix the problem.
327
 Nonetheless, rhetorical claims about a federal 
 
 324. See, e.g., WEINBERG & HAASE, supra note 64, at 1 (describing the flexibility in the 
federal health reform law, and noting that because of California’s “front-runner status and the 
sheer size of its coverage expansion, California’s choices will have implications for other states as 
they address difficult issues, including minimizing adverse selection, promoting cost-conscious 
consumer choice, and seamlessly coordinating with public programs”). 
 325. Balkin, supra note 115, at 40. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Even in California, the first state to enact legislation and one of the leaders in developing 
an exchange, there continues to be disagreement about the best approach to take. One example is 
over how much power regulators should have to deny proposed premium increases found to be 
unreasonable. See Sandy Kleffman, Health Insurance Rate Regulation Measure Qualifies for 
California’s November 2014 Ballot, MERCURYNEWS.COM (Aug. 24, 2012), http:// 
www.mercurynews.com/health/ci_21385649/health-insurance-rate-regulation-measure-qualifies-
californias-november. There are also important conversations about how choices in health reform 
implementation will impact access for certain vulnerable populations, like people living with 
HIV/AIDS, who have relied heavily on essential community providers. See, e.g., CROWLEY & 
KATES, supra note 55; WALTER A. ZELMAN, COMMUNITY-BASED NONPROFIT MEDICAID PLANS 
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takeover that suppresses state power and individual liberty cannot 
withstand the reality of implementation.
328
 
In fact, if the Court had followed the approach championed by 
the Joint Dissenters in the name of federalism, the result would have 
had the perverse, immediate, and long-term consequences of 
undermining states’ rights and individual liberty.
329
 Rather than 
giving states greater choice, which was the result of the majority’s 
compromise, the Joint Dissenters would have deprived states of any 
choice to take advantage of the federal funding offered for public or 
private expansion. They ignored the fact that for both the public and 
private expansions, the ACA empowered states to do things they 
wanted to do but otherwise could not because of a lack of 
resources.
330
 Finally, they downplayed the role of consumer choice 
 
AND THE NEW HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2010), 
available at www.statecoverage.org/files/SCI-ZelmanMedicaidExchanges.pdf; Marian Mulkey, 
Should California Establish a Basic Health Program for Certain Low-Income Residents?, 
GrantWatch Blog, HEALTHAFFAIRS (May 10, 2012), available at http://healthaffairs.org/blog 
/2012/05/10/should-california-establish-a-basic-health-program-for-Certain-low-income-residents 
/?cat=grantwatch. Similar concerns arise about the success of the new small employer exchanges. 
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Employers and the Exchanges Under the Small Business Health 
Options Program: Examining the Potential and the Pitfalls, 31 HEALTH AFF. 267 (Feb. 2012), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-the-Literature/2012/Feb/Small-
Business-Health-Options-Program.aspx. 
 328. Interestingly, some of the latest attacks by Republican opponents of reform further 
undermine their own claims of a federal takeover. See, e.g., Sara Hansard, Upton, Grassley Call 
for More HHS Oversight of How States Using Exchange Grant Funds, BLOOMBERGBNA 
HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (Oct. 1, 2012). 
 329. The Joint Dissenters, and opponents of reform, wrongly assume that the only alternative 
is no federal action. But as Ginsburg pointed out, the dissent’s legal reasoning would limit the 
federal government’s ability to experiment primarily through market-based reform, but not its 
ability to act on its own. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2612–13 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the ACA’s approach was consistent with federalism and far more 
protective of individual liberty and state governments than the alternative: 
Aware that a national solution was required, Congress could have taken over the 
health-insurance market by establishing a tax-and-spend federal program like Social 
Security. Such a program, commonly referred to as a single-payer system . . . would 
have left little, if any, room for private enterprise or the States. Instead of going this 
route, Congress enacted the ACA, a solution that retains a robust role for private 
insurers and state governments. 
Id. 
 330. Id. at 2667–68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). To date, the federal 
government has provided generous grants to the states totaling over $1 billion. Health Insurance 
Exchange Establishment Grants, 2012, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://statehealthfacts.kff.org/ 
comparetable.jsp?ind=954&cat=17 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
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in determining whether to buy insurance and devalued the fact that 
the ACA removes market impediments to healthcare so critical for 
realizing the promise of liberty.
331
 
2.  Adaptability of Federal Healthcare Programs 
One aspect of the Court’s decision has particularly significant 
implications for the future of health policy: the characterization of 
the Medicaid expansion as a “new” and “different” program, on 
which the Court’s coercion finding turned. This characterization 
creates tremendous uncertainty about the federal government’s 
ability to adapt its healthcare programs to evolving knowledge and 
market realities. As noted earlier, Medicaid was enacted in 1965, and 
though it initially defined eligibility categories narrowly, its mission 
was defined more broadly. States have been the drivers of many 
changes in the Medicaid program as their own needs change, and the 
flexibility inherent in Medicaid’s administrative structure allows the 
federal government to be responsive to states’ needs. Medicaid’s 
evolution reflects an ongoing state–federal conversation about how 
to cover the greatest number of those in need in a cost-efficient and 
effective way. Program amendments are part of this conversation; the 
federal government uses them to encourage or discourage practices 
based on the results of state experimentation and to provide greater 
federal support for expanding local need. 
The characterization of the expansion as “new” creates the 
possibility that future program changes will be deemed by courts to 
be too radical or different to be enforced as a program amendment. 
The Court failed, however, to give any guidance for determining 
when changes qualify as dramatic enough to be deemed “new.” For 
example, Chief Justice Roberts could not cite to any text in the 
Medicaid Act that limited its mission to only the original Medicaid 
categories. Rather, he simply assumed that extending coverage to all 
adults under 133 percent of the federal poverty level would mean 
that Medicaid is no longer a program to help the neediest among us, 
 
 331. Scholars familiar with how healthcare markets work tend to argue that the ACA does not 
go far enough and that greater federal action is necessary to fix market impediments. See, e.g., 
Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 123 (arguing that Congress is too federalist in nature and defers too 
much to the states). 
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an assumption which defies reality.
332
 Longstanding programs, like 
Medicaid, will be particularly vulnerable to this uncertainty in light 
of the magnitude of the change likely to occur over a long period of 
time and the significant amount of funding upon which states 
inevitably come to rely.
333
 
3.  Uncertainty Created by 
NFIB’s “Opt In” Compromise 
The Court’s Medicaid holding has created a more immediate 
and practical concern about access for poor, childless adults in states 
that choose not to participate in the expansion.
334
 The ACA provides 
that adults with an income up to 133 percent of the federal poverty 
level will be eligible for Medicaid as of 2014, but Medicaid will not 
be an option for these individuals in the opt-out states.
335
 The ACA 
only provides for federal subsidies to help individuals with an 
income between 100–400 percent of the federal poverty level.
336
 In 
opt-out states, this means that people below the federal poverty line 
will be left without any federal subsidy to purchase insurance in the 
private market and without the Medicaid alternative—making it 
virtually certain that they will remain uninsured and dependent on 
 
 332. See supra Part II.A (describing the groups most likely to be uninsured and in need of 
help prior to the ACA); see also STREMIKIS ET AL., supra note 40 (defining “vulnerable 
populations” as including “people with low incomes, the uninsured, and minorities”). The view of 
a broader population as “in need” is shared by states that have implemented various programs 
prior to the ACA to address the most serious consequences of gaps in the healthcare market. For 
example, states have provide targeted help to groups with certain chronic conditions—like breast 
or prostate cancer, or HIV—offering free or low cost diagnostic care, treatment, and education on 
prevention. Other programs, such as high risk pools, have a broader scope, but have strict 
eligibility requirements and are limited in terms of the numbers of people they can take. 
 333. For a more thorough exploration of the implications of the Medicaid coercion holding, 
see Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 285; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging 
Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128977. 
 334. See GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY ET AL., URBAN INST., HEALTH POLICY CTR , MAKING THE 
MEDICAID EXPANSION AN ACA OPTION: HOW MANY LOW-INCOME AMERICANS COULD 
REMAIN UNINSURED, 1 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412606-
Making-the-Medicaid-Expansion-an-ACA-Option.pdf. But see Ralph Lindeman, Most States 
Likely to Expand Coverage Due to Financial Incentives, Speakers Say, BLOOMBERGBNA 
HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Oct. 15, 2012). 
 335. GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION, supra note 41, at 8. 
 336. See id. 
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the inconsistent and ever-dwindling patchwork of public hospitals 
and clinics. 
This picture gets even more complicated for the subset of newly 
eligibles who would otherwise be eligible for federal subsidies for 
use on the federal exchange. Residents in states that do not opt in to 
Medicaid expansion are also unlikely to have a state exchange. 
Recall that states can refuse to establish their own exchanges and 
thus not participate in the private insurance reforms (“private opt 
out”). The federal government will establish a federal exchange, with 
the expectation that residents in these private opt-out states can use 
their federal subsidies to purchase insurance on this federal 
exchange. However, at least some reform opponents are now 
questioning whether these subsidies can be used on federal 
exchanges, arguing that the ACA authorizes them only for state-
based exchanges.
337
 Such challenges hurt already vulnerable citizens 
by restricting their choice in the new private and public expansions, 
which have already been found constitutional by the Supreme Court. 
It is difficult to see how these kinds of attacks serve opponents’ 
purported liberty goals. 
On the other hand, state opposition to the Medicaid expansion 
may prove to be more political rhetoric than a firm policy position 
that can withstand the reality of the market and its residents’ needs. 
When Medicaid and Medicare were first enacted, government 
encountered the same kinds of accusations of a federal threat to 
 
 337. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The 
Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX: J. LAW-
MEDICINE 119 (2013) (arguing that the ACA does not permit the use of tax credits and subsidies 
in federal exchanges created in states without exchanges of their own). But see Timothy Jost, Tax 
Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with the Affordable Care Act’s 
Language and History, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (July 18, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-in-federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-consistent-with-the-affordable-
care-acts-language-and-history/ (arguing that the legislative history and assumptions by the 
Congressional Budget Office evidence Congress’s intent that premium subsidies to be available 
in all exchanges). There has been litigation and congressional action around this issue. See Ralph 
Lindeman, House Oversight Chair Seeks Documents in Federal Exchange-Tax Subsidy Probe, 
BLOOMBERGBNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Aug. 29, 2012) (noting that Republican 
Representative Darrell Issa, chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee, sought information from the IRS in order to challenge the IRS rule that permits tax 
subsidies for people purchasing insurance on federal exchanges); Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–5, 11–21, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11-
030-RAW (E.D. Okla. 2012) (arguing that the IRS rule permitting use of subsidies on federal 
exchanges expands employer obligations in violation of the ACA and undermines the state’s 
authority to regulate health policy as permitted by the ACA). 
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states’ rights and individual freedom. Yet today every state 
participates in Medicaid, and Medicare has become an entitlement 
that seniors and providers fight to keep. Only time will tell. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
By upholding the ACA, NFIB has paved the way for reform, but 
it has not completely foreclosed political and other legal attacks on 
reform. On the political side, Republican lawmakers will continue to 
try to impede funding and implementation efforts, though such 
attempts have been largely unsuccessful so far.
338
 On the legal side, 
rights-based challenges have been filed claiming that certain aspects 
of reform are being implemented in an unconstitutional way; 
however, these claims do not jeopardize the entire law.
339
 The ones 
receiving the greatest attention are those challenging HHS 
regulations requiring prescription contraception coverage as part of 
preventive care.
340
 But other aspects of the law, such as the provision 
 
 338. See, e.g., Erick Erickson, The Supreme Court Forces Us to Deal Within the Political 
System, RED STATE BLOG (June 28, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.redstate.com/erick/2012/06/ 
28/the-supreme-court-forces-us-to-deal-within-the-political-system/. 
 339. One challenge seems designed to try to take a second bite out of the apple by challenging 
the constitutionality of the mandate, and thus the ACA itself. This latest challenge arises out of 
the NFIB’s characterization of the shared responsibility payment as a tax. The claim is that if it is 
a tax, then it is subject to the constitutional provision that requires taxes to originate in the House 
of Representatives, which opponents argue did not happen. See Pete Kasperowicz, GOP 
Resolution: Healthcare Law Violates Constitution for Not Originating in the House, HILL’S 
FLOOR ACTION BLOG (July 20, 2012, 8:07 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/ 
239127-gop-resolution-healthcare-law-violates-constitution-for-not-originating-in-the-house. 
This claim seems based on a quibble about the way in which the House version of the bill 
evolved, and thus it is unlikely to be viewed as plausible basis for attack. 
 340. A number of suits have been brought challenging the HHS’s rule requiring employers to 
provide preventive services, including prescription contraception for women. See, e.g., O’Brien v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476-CEJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140097 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims of 
infringement on religious liberty and violation of the Administrative Procedure Act); Newland v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104835 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012) 
(granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction based on allegations that the mandate 
violated the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act); Wheaton College v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-
CV-01169-ESH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120187 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction because the application of the preventive services regulation 
remains hypothetical and thus the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an injury-in-fact and does not have 
a ripe claim). The Wheaton College case also notes that as of August 24, 2012, twenty-six 
lawsuits had been brought challenging the preventive services regulations with regard to 
contraception requirement. Id. at *3. 
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creating an independent payment advisory commission,
341
 the use of 
federal subsidies in federal exchanges,
342
 and the Medicaid 
maintenance of effort provisions in the ACA,
343
 have either been 
challenged or will likely be challenged soon. 
A thorough consideration of these challenges is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but they signal a rocky landscape ahead. 
Although they will likely keep lawyers and commentators busy for 
some time to come, they will not undermine reform implementation, 
which is already underway. NFIB has ushered in an exciting new 
period of reform in which federal officials, states, insurers, providers, 
advocates, and, most importantly, consumers are working together to 
try to solve the problem of rising healthcare costs by improving 
healthcare access. As a result of this process, and as more of the 
benefits of health reform become available and are understood,
344
 
there will likely be less support, or even tolerance, for continued 
attacks on reform. 
  
 
 341. See Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124196 (D. 
Ariz. Aug. 31, 2012) (stayed pending the outcome of NFIB); Second Amended Civil Rights 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5–34, Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714-
PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2012), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124196. 
 342. See supra note 337. 
 343. The ACA’s maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement prohibits states from cutting 
eligibility standards for certain Medicaid beneficiaries or imposing stricter standards until 2014. 
Commentators are now speculating about whether these provisions could be vulnerable to the 
same coercion argument used in NFIB. See Ralph Lindeman, Medicaid ACA Opponents Eyeing 
New Challenge To Law’s Maintenance-of-Effort Requirement, BLOOMBERGBNA, HEALTH CARE 
DAILY REPORT (Aug. 31, 2012); see also Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 341, at 5–34 (challenging the MOE provisions). 
 344. See, e.g., News Release: Through the Affordable Care Act, Americans with Medicare 
Will Save $5,000 through 2022, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/09/20120921a.html; Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, The 
Health Care Law is Saving Americans Money, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/09/11/health-care-law-saving-americans-money (touting 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’s 2012 Annual Rate Review Report). The 
report notes that the rate review program, which requires plans to spend at least 80 percent of 
premiums on healthcare and demonstrate compliance with the law, has already gone into effect 
and saved Americans about $1 billion on their health insurance premiums. See also S.R. Collins, 
R. Robertson, T. Garber & M.M. Doty, Young, Uninsured and in Debt: Why Young Adults Lack 
Health Insurance and How the Affordable Care Act Is Helping, COMMONWEALTH FUND, 
(June 2012), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2012/Jun/Young-
Adults-2012.aspx (noting that 6.6 million young adults stayed on their parents plans between 
November 2010 and November 2011, who would not have been able to prior to the ACA). 
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